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MARKETING UNDER THE 1962 FARM PROGRAM 
It is the purpose of the National Agricultural Advisory Commission to 
review the policies and administration of farm programs within the jurisdiction 
of the Department of Agriculture, and such related matters as the Secretary 
shall determine, and offer its advice to the Secretary. The Commission was 
established by an Executive Order on July 20, 1953, and now operates under 
an Executive Order of May 3, 1961. 
Provision is made for rotation of membership. Successors are to be 
appointed for terms of three years. President Kennedy appointed the present 
members of the NAAC on June 21, 1961, at which time he designated Harry B. 
Caldwell of North Carolina as chairman of the Commission. 
The Commission has been meeting quarterly, beginning July 11, 1962, 
and has been holding two-day sessions. There is occasional need for the 
Commission to meet a third day. There are other times when individual 
members of the Commission serve as a liaison of the Commission on the various 
commodity committees. 
On July 11, at the first meeting of the NAAC, President Kennedy met with 
the group in the Cabinet Room. He spoke briefly to the Commission and called 
upon it to undertake its work in serious fashion, mindful of domestic well-being 
and international relations. 
The President counselled a constructive approach and deplored the 
prevalence of shallow politics and economic nonsense in popular discussion of 
agricultural matters. The extent of such views tends (a) to confuse the balanced 
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judgment essential for wise use of our agricultural abundance in satisfaction of 
basic human needs and (b) to hamper action to advance the interests of farmers 
in the national economy. He asked that the NAAC put the national interest first 
and regard agriculture as a great national asset, an asset effective in winning 
friends abroad and in checking the activities of unfriendly nations. 
The President invited straight-from-the-shoulder discussion of two 
paramount issues: 
What should the administration do now? 
What ought to be done in the future? 
In these terms the NAAC can meet its responsibility to recommend 
measures for consideration by the Secretary of Agriculture, which he in turn 
must accept or reject as a responsible public official. 
Above all, the President observed, there is a mutual responsibility to 
penetrate and resolve the confusion that beclouds thinking and hinders action 
affecting agricultural affairs. 
Secretary Freeman in speaking of the group stressed the need to get 
public recognition of the accomplishments of agriculture. He further pointed 
out the challenge which exists to use agricultural abundance constructively in 
the nation and abroad. 
Dr. Williard W. Cochrane, Director of Agricultural Economics, has been 
the USDA staff officer attending all the meetings of the Commission, and is the 
representative of the Secretary. 
All the resources of the Department are available to the Commission in 
carrying out its objectives. The Commission has had a number of special 
subcommittees, one being Public Relations and Information and the other on 
Goals and Objectives of Agriculture. After these committees prepared their 
reports and they were accepted, the committees were discharged. At the 
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October meeting six new committees were set up, each composed of four Commis 
members and a staff member from the Departn:e nt. While the Commission 
has had subcommittees on feed grains, wheat, cotton, dairy, and other 
commodities, the Secretary has also established many advisory commodity 
committees. One of my assignments with Claude Wickard of Indiana has been 
to serve as a representative of the Commission to the Advisory Committee on 
Feed Grains and Wheat. I have been most interested in these commodities 
because of their importance in the Midwest. 
I should emphasize the fact that the Commission is advisory only and all 
final decisions are the responsibility of the Administration. Thus after 
considering information from many sources, the Secretary of Agriculture must 
advise the President of the United States on legislation that he believes should 
come before the Congress. 
On January 31, 1962 the President of the United States forwarded to the 
Congress his recommendations for agricultural programs starting with 1963 
and subsequent years. These are described in detail in H. R. 10010 and 
summarized by the Department of Agriculture in the 11 Digest of Food and 
Agriculture Act of 1962. 11 
Following is an analysis of the farm legislation, as recommended by the 
President, with our analysis and recommendations in line with the policies of 
the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation. 
MAJOR PROVISIONS 
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1962 deals primarily with the problems 
of surpluses in feed grains, wheat, and dairy products; and also provides for 
legislation dealing with the establishment of marketing orders for turkeys. 
This bill represents a big step in the direction of government control and 
regulation of agricultural production. The bill calls for quotas on dairy products 
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feed grains (corn, oats, barley, and sorghum), and on wheat. In the case of 
feed grains and wheat, quotas are translated into acreage allotments. Controls, 
before they become effective, would require approval by at least two-thirds of 
the farmers voting in a referendum proclaimed by the Secretary. 
FEED GRAIN AND Vl.HEAT PROGRAMS 
The President called for "mandatory acreage allotment" programs on all 
feed grains (corn, grain sorghum, oats, and barley--with rye included at the 
discretion of the Secretary). 
Marketing quotas (translated into acreage allotments) would be proclaimed 
for feed grains. Over-quota grain would be subject to cash penalties equal to 
65 percent of parity- -even if fed on the farm. If farmers rejected marketing 
quotas in a referendum, there would be no price support programs for feed 
grains, and the Secretary would be authorized to sell up to 10 million tons of 
Commodity Credit Corporation feed grain stocks on the market for unrestricted 
use in a year (presumably in addition to authority to sell grain stocks going out 
of condition). 
Farmers growing less than 25 acres of feed grain could stay out of the 
quota program and plant up to their base acreages. Such farmers would not be 
allowed to vote in the referendum. Farmers exceeding their feed grain acreage 
allotments on one farm would not be eligible for pl"ice support on any grain 
produced on another farm. 
Producers would also be required to devote "to conservation uses" an 
acreage equal to the difference between their acreage allotments for feed grains 
and their "base period" acreages. The Secretary could permit these diverted 
acres to be grazed. Payments would be made for diverted acres, and farmers 
could voluntarily divert an additional 20 percent o£ their feed grain allotment 
acres in return for payments. Alternatively, producers could elect to divert, 
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in addition to the reqUlred acreage, such amount as would bring the total 
acreage diverted to 20 acres. 
The wheat program would take effect at the same time as the feed grain 
program. It would be a three-price program, with two types of marketing 
certificates (for domestic and export use). The three prices v.ould be high for 
domestic milling wheat, indefimte for export wheat, and low for feed wheat. 
Marketing quotas on wheat would be continued and producers V/0 uld be 
required to retire acreage in proportion to the amount the national allotment 
is reduced below 55 million acres. There would be no price support program 
if quotas are rejected in a farmer referendum. Instead, the Secretary would 
be authorized to dump up to 200 million bushels of CCC wheat on the market. 
Producers growing less than 15 acres of wheat could stay out of the 
quota program and plant up to their base acreages. Such farmers would not 
be allowed to vote in the referendum. 
Analysis 
The recommendation of the Department of Agriculture for this new legis-
lation does not provide farmers w1th a realistic alternative in the referendum. 
If they failed to vote favorably on the feed grain control program, supports 
would be ended and the government would be authorized to sell 10 million tons 
pe.r year from its surplus stocks. In addition, in the case of wheat, if farmers 
turned down the control program in the referendum, they would no longer enjoy 
price supports and the government would be empowered to sell 200 million 
bushels of wheat per year from its surplus stocks. These rates of sale for feed 
grains and for wheat would be sufficient virtually to break the markets for these 
commodities, both in the United States and in the world. Ii would result in 
bankruptcy for large numbers of farmers and for businessmen selling to farmers. 
How this is sold will be tremendously important to marketing people. 
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In his message, the President said of these effects: "Four independent 
studies, by Cornell University, Iowa State University, the Joint Economic 
Committee of Congress, and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 
show how sharp would be the drop in farm prices and farm income if farm 
programs were abandoned. These studies agree that wheat prices would be 
sliced almost in half, oats prices 25 percent, barley 28 percent, soybeans 
38 percent, grain sorghums 22 percent, and dairy 17 percent. Non-price-
supported commodities would also suffer. Livestock commodities would drop 
24 percent, egg prices 20 percent, cattle prices 25 percent, hogs 30 percent, 
and broilers and turkeys even lower than this year." 
Actually these estimates of the impacts are conservative since they are 
based on.Production levels prior to the large increases in productivity of the 
past two years. 
There is strong evidence to indicate that in order to bring effective reduc-
tion in surpluses of wheat and feed grains over a five-year period, it will be 
necessary to make some reduction on each farm. However, it would be a 
mistake to attempt to control and restrict feed grain and wheat acreage while 
leaving the door open for planting of as much soybeans and other oil seeds and 
minor crops as farmers wish. The estimates, as made by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, indicate that there presently are 17 million acres of land which 
will be transferred to cropland use in the years ahead. Other estimates indicate 
that there may be several times this many acres. In either case, severely 
limiting feed grains and wheat acreage while permitting farmers complete freedom 
to utilize all these extra acres for soybeans production, with soybean supports 
at $2. 25, could easily result in a soybean crop almost double that of 1961, which 
in itself exceeded domestic and foreign needs. Acreage reduction on all farm& 
would greatly increase fertilizer rates per acre. 
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The Act provides that, at the discretion of the Secretary, commercial 
feed or commercial wheat areas may be established. 11 The commercial area 
shall be proclaimed at the time the national quota is proclaimed ...• and such 
national rm. rketing quotas shall not be in effect with respect to feed grains (or 
wheat when appropriate} produced outside the commercial area. 11 In addition 
the Act provides for a minimum of 25 acres of feed grains and 15 acres of 
wheat, below which farmers will not be required to make any reductions below 
their base acreages to achieve the adjustment of supply to existing marketing 
requirements. These two features together will tend to push feed grains and 
wheat out of areas of greatest efficiency, the areas in which production presently 
is concentrated, and into the marginal areas where, under the program, 
production restrictions will be less stringent or entirely non-existent. For 
greatest efficiency and fairness, a program of controls such as this, if it is to 
be applied, should be applied to all farmers who raise the commodity regardless 
of their volume of production. 
In general, the program of strict controls o£ output is likely to restrict 
the adoption of improved technology and to place American agriculture at a 
disadvantage relative to agriculture in the remainder of the world. A compari-
son of the controlled commodities and the commodities not presently being 
controlled in the United States provided some evidence of the relative impacts 
of controls on efficiency of production here,~relative to other countries. In general, 
those commodities with strictest controls are least able to compete freely in 
world markets. This is particularly true in commodities where controls came 
early and have prevented achievement of economies of scale or adoption of 
labor-saving technology. What would be the productive efficiency of United States 
corn production, compared with the present, if we had embarked on a program 
of strict controls in the early thirties? Adoption of improved technology 
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would have come much more slowly, farm size would have been much smaller, 
and there would have been more farmers and more farm labor but less output. 
This would have resulted in an economic disadvantage both to consumers and to 
farmers. 
Recommendations for Amendment 
{a) It is essential that along with feed grains and wheat for feed purposes, 
also should be included oil seeds, particularly soybeans, and other minor crops 
which might compete with, or be substitutes for, feed grains; 
(b) that the referendum, when 1t is submitted to the farmer, spells out in 
detail the period during which the controls would be in effect (for example, five 
years) and the a manner by which, after the period of adjustment, either a 
return will be made to the market place without controls, or any extension of this 
program would be re-submitted to farmers for referendum covering such 
extension; 
(c) that farmers should be given realistic alternatives in any referendum 
on controls; 
(d) that the minimum acreage exemption for both wheat and feed grains 
be eliminated (o:r greatly reduced), thereby providing that all farmers (or 
essentially all farmers) will participate in the referendum and in the acreage reduc-
tions if the referendum passes; 
(e) that the country not be divided into commerc1al and non-commercial 
areas with restrictions only applying to commercial areas for any crop; 
(f) that each farmer be permitted to use up to five acres of his diverted 
acreage for hay or pasture in lieu of acceptance of payments; 
(g) that no grazing of diverted acres be permitted other than that on the 
five acres, as outlined in Item (£); 
{h) that financing for this program come primarily from sale of surplus 
wheat and feed grains; 
- 9 -
(i) that payment for diverted acres be set at a level equal to approxi-
mately 35 percent of the average value of production on such acres; 
(j) that price supports be held at 1961 levels, except that the system of 
wheat pricing, as outlined in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962, be used. 
DAIRY PRODUCTS 
The proposed legislation would establish a marketing base for each 
producer. The producer's yearly allotment would be a percentage of his base. 
Any producer exceeding his marketing allotment would be required to pay 
a surplus marketing fee. This fee could be as high as $2. 75 per hundredweight, 
at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture. 
If milk producers vote down the control program in a referendum, 
government price support purchases would be limited to $300million per year. 
If producers accept quotas, prices will be maintained at high levels by purchases 
plus control of output. 
The President recommended that producer allotments or quotas be 
authorized in federal order markets. 
Analysis 
For dairy products, the alternative to failure to approve quotas is not as 
drastic as for wheat and feed grains. Not only are there no threats of large 
sales of surplus dairy products in the market, but the Secretary of Agriculture 
would be authorized to spend up to $300 million per year to buy up surplus 
stocks of dairy products. This, taken along with the decline in feed prices, 
which would accompany failure of farmers to vote for feed grain quotas, probably 
would leave dairy farmers well off relative to other farmers. 
Prior to 1961 there was ,3- reasonably good balance between supply and 
demand, but in 1961 the Secretary raised the support prices of milk to $3.40 
per hundredweight. Production jumped 2 billion pounds and consumption declined 
by approxirm tely 3 billion pounds. The government suddenly found itself buying 
up large amounts of manufactured dairy products to support prices. A solution 
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suggested js controls to reduce production. A small reduction in price support 
levels might be just as effective in reducing output in the same way that a small 
increase in price supports results in increased production. However, the major 
part of the problem stems from the decline in consumption. There doesn't 
appear to be much effort being made to increase sales of dairy products either 
at home or abroad, or to do something about the real causes of the decline in 
consumption. In many foreign countries almost no dairy products are consumed. 
Restricting supply and government-sponsored monopoly pricing of dairy products 
could do the same here. 
There are other evidences that farmers can and do react to price and 
adjust production in the free market place.-!./ 
The problem of achieving effective increases ln incomes of farmers without 
capitalizing this into a pur ely artificial certificate value is one of the major 
obstacles to using this type of program. Suggested quotas or marketing certifi-
cates (rights to sell), if they are simply placed in the market place, would be 
bid up to levels which would quickly negate any increases in income cerived from 
higher prices and artificial product scarcity. Better farmers would bid market-
ing certificates up to the point where they would represent essentially the full 
differential between the artificially higher prices and the other costs of production 
of efficient producers. These certificates then become a regular production cost 
item of new farmers or farmers wanting to expand output. These artificial costs 
would make it particularly difficult for small farmers seeking to expand, for the 
farmer starting up, or any farmer seeking to sell in foreign markets. 
1/ For example, a few months ago there was a great deal of concern over 
the large supplies of broilers and turkeys which resulted in extremely low prices 
and unprofitable farm operations. Since then, in reaction to the low prices, 
without government control, growers have reduced production of broilers to 
levels which will once more make production profitable, and indicate their 
intentions of making similar reductions in turkey production. 
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That the marketing certificates will have an artificial value is evident from 
the text of the Act: "The Secretary may utilize funds available for purchase or 
loans on dairy products under the price support program to purchase and cancel 
bases offered voluntarily for sale by producers ... 11 This might be big business 
for s orne one. 
Apparently the Secretary will be authorized to use available funds to make 
loans for farmers to cover costs of purchasing certificates, costs which do not 
now exist. As succeeding generations start farming, dairy prices v.d.ll have to 
be progressively higher to cover increasing certificate costs, if the objectives 
of income and return on investment (including the compounded costs of 
certificates) equal to those in non-farm section are even to be approached. For 
example, with efficient producers able to produce milk for under $3 per hundred-
weight, manufactured milk supports now at $3. 40, and fluid milk prices much 
higher, negotiable certificates will have a minimum value of 40 cents per 
hundredweight. Farmers will receive paper profit of hundreds of millions or 
even billions of dollars on economically worthless marketing certificates which 
become the new producer's costs. The Secretary will have arbitrary authority 
to decide how these certificates will be allocated and transferred. Inter-farm 
and inter-regional production shifts, for example, to urban areas will be at the 
discretion of the Secretary. 
"Sec. 436. A producer may, to such extent and subject to such terms and 
conditions as the Secretary may prescribe, transfer his marketing base, or any 
part thereof, to any other producer or prospective new producer v;iho agrees to 
utilize such base for the disposition in commercial channels of milk, butterfat, 
or dairy products, produced in the same state as that in which the transferor 
engaged in production, or any state adjacent thereto, or in such other state or 
area as the Secretary may authorize." 
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With high certificate prices on milk, it will be to the advantage of many 
dairy producers to sell their certificates, collect the fees each month, and go 
into beef or hog production in competition with present producers, thereby injur-
ing the market of livestock producers. 
Recommendations for Amendment 
(a) that instead of the proposed program for marketing quotas or other 
controls on dairying, as outlined in the Act, the basic causes of the large 
increase in production and drop in consumption be determined quickly, and 
that an effective program to stimulate the demand for milk at home and abroad 
be activated; 
(b) that if price adjustments are necessary, these be made; 
(c) that in no case should any system of marketing controls or quotas 
be tied to the present program of fluid milk marketing orders, nor should any-
thing be done which would impair the effectiveness of the present fluid milk 
marketing orders. 
LAND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM 
The President said he will soon send Congress a special message "devoted 
to proposals for the maximum utilization of our land resources. 11 
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1962 is the first part of a broad program 
which the administration has suggested for agriculture, covering many years 
ahead. In addition to specific commodity by commodity 11 supply management 
plans, 11 the Department of Agriculture and the Administration apparently plan 
a major program of land use adjustment which will have as its objective taking 
out of cultivation much of the erosive land now being cropped and transferring 
it to less intensive uses, such as pasture, forests, and recreation. 
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In his farm message he requested amendment of the Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act to expand the Agricultural Conservation Payments 
Program to include payments for changes in land use. 
He also asked for: 
(a) Amendment of the Bankhead1-Jones Farm Tenant Act to permit 
federal purchase of land for recreational development and wildlife protection. 
(b) Amendment of the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act 
to permit USDA to share in the cost of land acquired by local organizations for 
fish, wildlife, or recreational dev€1. opment. 
(c) Expansion of the authority of the Farmers Home Administration to 
make loans to farmers for recreational enterprises. 
In his message to Congress, the President estimated that by 1980 we will 
need 50 million fewer acres than we have today. The objective of the land use 
plan is to insure that the major part of the reduction in crop acreage will come 
from land which is being eroded away. Land of this quality generally doesn 1t 
provide an adequate return to farm families in intensive crop use. This 
particular part of the program is much needed. The major objections to this 
is that the early plans of the Department are much too limited. For example, 
early plans call for only 400 thousand acres to be taken out the first year and 
a like amount the second year, with this ultimately being stepped up to 68 
million acres by 1980, for a net cropland reduction of 51 million acres. An 
accelerated program could be used in conjunction with a program of retirement 
of whole farms as a major method of reducing production of surplus commodities. 
Evidence of past research indicates that whole farm retirement on a bid basis 
is highly effective and efficient in achieving de sir able long-run adjustment of 
both land and labor used in farming. 
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In the interest of achieving an effective solution with a minimum of hard-
ship and loss of freedom for farmers, it would be more desirable for 1963 to 
start this program off with retirement of 30 to 35 million additional acres of 
cropland on a whole farm bid basis, with the emphasis on the marginal lands. 
A large part of this 35 million acres ultimately then could be permanently 
adjusted out of agriculture. However, for acreages which were of such quality 
that they might ultimately be returned to cropping, the return could be made as 
offsetting amounts of permanent adjustments of cropland were made. 
Recommendations 
{a) That under the Conservation and Land Use Program, amendment be 
made to provide for retirement of whole farms on a bid basis, starting in 1963 
at a level of approximately 30 million acres on a long-term rental or purchase 
basis; 
(b) that emphasis be on retirement of erosive and otherwise marginal 
land; 
(c) that as this land or land presently in the Conservation Reserve Program 
be returned to cultivation, the production of this land be offset by retirement of 
erosive lands either to less intensive agricultural uses or to non-agricultural 
uses, similar to the outline contained in the Act and the Secretary's statement 
of January 30, 1962. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR RURAL PEOPLE 
Another phase o£ the Department's long-range program, the program for 
economic development for rural people, like the land retirement program is 
long overdue. The really major problem of low income of farm families results 
from the excess supply of labor on the farm. More specifically it stems from 
the large number of small uneconomic farm units engaged in agriculture, most 
of which are family units. This excess, it is recognized, results primarily 
- 15 -
from the rapid adoption of labor-saving and production-increasing technology. 
It is difficult to bring a major increase in aggregate net farm income without 
special attention to labor adjustment; but if the rate of off-farm migration can be 
accelerated, a major improvement in the average farm income of families 
remaining on the farm can be achieved. 
This part of the Administration's proposals should be given major emphasis. 
Emphasis should~ be on individual loans, as the Act suggests. Subsistence 
payments or other forms of direct assistance for retraining would be much more 
effective in achieving the rate of adjustment needed. Emphasis should be placed 
on direct assistance in providing educational facilities and relocation assistance 
without expectation of later repayment. Actually, as these people move into 
better and higher-paying jobs, the repayment to the Treasury would be made 
through increases in payments of income taxes. Local businessmen could 
expect that in some areas the farm business would decline and the non-farm 
business would increase. 
For more details on these two programs, see "Food and Agriculture, a 
Program of the 1960 1 s," by Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, 
January 30, 1962, pages 6 to 19. 
Recommendations 
(a) That the program of economic development for rural people, as 
outlined in the Secretary's statement, be activated on a large scale to provide 
opportunities for rural people equal to those available to urban people; 
(b) particular emphasis should be placed on programs for retraining, 
relocation and finding jobs, and efforts to achieve greater industrial and 
commercial development of rural areas, making use of both human and 
physical resources in rural areas; 
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(c) that this be operated in conjunction with and in close coordination 
with the program of retirement of whole farms. 
OTHER POINTS 
The President proposed changes in Public Law 480 (originally known as 
the Agricultural Trade Development Act) which would change its ot'iginal purpose 
as a surplus disposal measure. It would become more of a world-wide relief 
law. 
One proposed amendment to P. L. 480 would permit donations of commodi-
ties such as dried beans and peas --which currently are not in the Commodity 
Credit Corporation's inventory. The implication of this is that such action would 
be taken as necessary to create extra supplies of such agricultural commodities 
as the President desires for use in this program. 
A more far-reaching amendment would authorize the President to 
"negotiate and carry out agreements" to promote "multinational"programs for 
food assistance "with international organizations and intergovernmental 
groupings. 11 
This amendment would presumably permit U. S. participation in programs 
through which U. S. farm surpluses would be distributed through the United 
Nations (in programs such as SUNFED --the Special United Nations Fund for 
Economic Development) or a World Food Bank. 
After covering the subject of donations of food at home and abroad, the 
President outlined several new commodity programs which he asked Congress 
to adopt. 
Recommendations 
(a) That the use of commodities not now in CCC inventory should not be 
handled through P. L. 480 or in such a way as to create new surpluses; 
(b) that surplus food program as a part of foreign economic development 
should be handled by the U. S. government rather than the United Nations. 
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GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The goals and objectives implied in the Administration's Agricultural 
Program, outlined in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962, are similar but 
not in complete agreement with the goals and objectives adopted by the Ohio 
Farm Bureau Federation, as set forth in their policy recommendations and 
adopted by the Delegate Body. 
"A Cropland Adjustment Program was adopted by the delegates to the 
43rd annual meeting of the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation on November 15, 1961. 
Its aim is (1) to maintain and improve farm income; (2) to reduce our agricul-
tural surpluses; and (3) to reduce government costs. The ultimate aim of this 
program is to help farmers balance supply and demand and eliminate the need 
for many of the present controls as well as to permit a return to the market 
place where farmers would be able to obtain prices comparable to the cost of 
things they buy. 11 
The real difference between the Administration's program and the 
recommendations of the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation delegates lies in this 
ultimate aim. It is the objective of the Ohio farmers to return farming to the 
market place as rapidly as this is possible and to minimize further government 
activity in farming. In contrast with this position, the Food and Agriculture 
Act of 1962 calls for controls. The Administration has indicated by this and 
other statements the belief that permanent controls on agricultural output (called 
supply management) are necessary and desirable and the goal of the Administration. 
The Ohio Farm Bureau Federation delegates outlined a program to 
accomplish the following objectives quickly, efficiently, and with a minimum of 
government control: 
(a) In less than five years eliminate surp~uses of feed grains and wheat, 
the major surplus items; 
(b) Cut government costs by $700 million to $1, 200 million the first 
year, and more in succeeding years; 
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(c) Provide needed long-range adjustment in labor and land used in 
agriculture; 
(d) Return agriculture to the market place without a large amount of 
government participation. 
Essentially these same objectives can be accomplished by the amendments 
to the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962, recommended above. 
Recommendations of the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation are based on methods 
proven by past actual experience and ample research results to be feasible, 
practical, and efficient in accomplishing these objectives. 
The Administration farm bills (H. R. 10010 and S. 2786) are now being 
considered by the House and Senate Agriculture Committees. Chairman Cooley 
of the House Agriculture Committee has indicated that he will hold hearings soon 
on the American Farm Bureau Cropland Adjustment Program bills. 
The program of the American Farm Bureau and the Ohio Farm Bureau are 
quite similar. For example: (ll The Ohio program would provide for a five-
year adjustment period during which both a voluntary and a compulsory program 
would be used to bring supplies of feed grains and wheat into balance with 
consumption. The American plan would depend entirely on a voluntary program; 
(2) The Ohio plan would permit supplies of CCC stocks to sell at a percent of 
parity, which would permit the government to reduce the CCC stocks and use 
them to pay for the program. The American plan would not permit the sale of 
CCC stocks below 115 percent of parity; ( 3) The Ohio program would also 
maintain the price supports at approximately the 1961 levels. The American 
plan would have price supports based on a percent of the preceding three-year 
average, which would result in a moderate, lowering of price supports. 
It is unfortunate that major farm organizations and the Administration 
could not have resolved some, if not all, of their differences before going to 
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the Congress. Much could have been accomplished in this area without a 
surrender of principle on the part of anyone. This was not done and, as a 
result, agriculture is divided and the outcome of farm legislation in this Session 
is uncertain. 
Some are saying that Congress may not take any action since we have an 
election in November. 
not have a program. 
be resumed in 1963. 
price support levels. 
If Congress takes no action, that does not mean we will 
If no action is taken, the program in effect in 1960 would 
This would mean unrestricted production of corn at fixed 
The price support rate for corn would be at 90o/o of the 
average price received by farmers during the preceding three years, but at a 
rate not less than 650/o of parity. A grower with an allotment for grain sorghum, 
barley, oats, or rye could comply with that allotment and at the same time 
increase his corn acreage to whatever amount he chose. 
For price support eligibility, the Secretary would have authority to require 
compliance with acreage allotments (except corn) production controls and 
marketing practices. Price supports could be set at rates determined by the 
Secretary to be fair and reasonable in relation to the support on corn. 
Roy F. Hendrickson , with the National Federation of Grain Cooperatives, 
makes the following statements regarding the bill: 
"Secretary Freeman is sincere, earnest, full of facts, humble. They like 
him, don't question him or argue much. But he can't sell his elixir - tough 
supply controls to be voted by farmers who would have the choice between that 
or no price supports and liquidation of inventories by CCC. Most members of the 
committees sense some tough logic but no political appeal in this rugged regimen • 
. • . • you get the feeling that what Freeman proposed, backed by a President 
evidently fed to the teeth with high farm costs, is largely academic. So there is 
a relaxed attitude as he talks on with the earnestness of an Eagle Scout. 
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It is still a kind of a stalemate, out of which will come a compromise that will 
perpetuate the status quo a little longer, modified in details ...•.. So the time 
of final decision has not come ••... No one is satisfied with the present farm 
program, but no one has come up with a better one that can win broad- scale 
support. There will be changes, but the really big ones are not in sight at this 
session of Congress. 11 
The National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, testifying before the House 
Agriculture Committee on H. R. 10010, said, "The approach of the proposed 
program is aimed at creating an economic climate in which farmers can hope 
to earn higher incomes through the market system. This would be done by seek-
ing to balance production with needs for agricultural commodities. . . In such 
a climate farmers will be able to strengthen their economic bargaining power 
and thus retain some of the rewards of their rising productivity. It seems 
to us imperative that a minimum gauge of effectiveness must rest on a reversal 
of the trend toward ever-mounting surpluses ..•••• a long-range transfer of 
excess resources out of agriculture is urgently needed because there is almost 
universal agreement that the growing imbalance between agricultural output 
and demand, domestic and foreign, for these products is caused by too many 
resources in the agricultural production plant. n 
There is a very hopeful note in the testimony of the National Council. It 
is difficult at this time to make any specific prediction as to what will happen. 
I will make the general prediction that Congress will modify the present adminis-
tration bills by eliminating that part referring to quotas on dairy production, 
change the feed grain and wheat parts of the bill to provide the farmer a more 
realistic alternative in any referendum, and provide that any compulsory land 
retirement would be for a specified period of time only. 
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The financing of the program should come primarily from the sale of 
surplus wheat and feed grains. A provision should be made to retire whole 
farms on a bid basis of from 30 to 35 million acres in addition to the approxi-
mately 28 million acres now retired. This program would be similar to the 
Conservation Reserve that was in effect from 1956 to 1959. 
What are the implications in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962 for 
marketing people? 
The implications are many and I assume that the panel which follows will 
take the responsibility for bringing them to our attention. 
What will the use of marketing certificates for wheat mean to the grain 
manager? How will the imposition of strict dairy production quotas effect the 
marketing of milk? If farmers vote against the Administration bill in a 
referendum, what will be the effect of dumping 10 million tons of feed grains and 
ZOO million bushel of wheat on the market annually? 
Are the acreage limitations proposed on grain production likely to cause 
a shift in production to southern states and to what extent would livestock 
production go with it? I refer particularly to those provisions for exemptions 
of farmers with below 25 acres of feed grain and non-commercial growing areas. 
If feed grain moves south, would processing plants tend also to move to the 
south? --would livestock, poultry, and dairy move south? 
Indications are that a city like Los Angeles in California, with rapidly 
increasing population, will need increased amounts of fluid milk. Will Wisconsin 
under the quota system continue to be chiefly a manufacturing milk state, or 
will its milk producers produce milk needed in California rather than the 
California producers? Will fluid milk be shipped to California from Wisconsin? 
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Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin would like to make sure that if we have 
milk quotas they will not be transferred to California, and that Wisconsin will 
supply California with its fluid milk. 
Is the Administration program consistent with an expanded foreign trade 
for agriculture? 
Will it hinder or help the President in dealing for trade concessions with 
the rapidly growing European Economic Community? 
CONCLUSION 
We have already stated what amendments we think should be made to the 
Administration bills in order to enable the legislation to best serve the needs 
of the United States and the people of the world. We believe the recommended 
changes would increase the income of the Ohio farmer, reduce government 
agricultural surpluses, cut government costs, and enable American agriculture 
to continue to increase its efficiency of production and compete successfully in 
the markets of the world. 
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Nmv DADW LEGISLATION 
For the dairy j_ndustry it UJ?pears rather obvious that supply is 
not in balance with demand at todays support prices. This means that 
the industry is faced with a choice of alternatives to correct this 
situation. These alternatives are: 
1. Lower or remove support prices 
2. Supply control 
3. Market development 
4. Combination of the above 
It is likely that programs will be developed and proposed in all 
four of these areas. It is essential that the various segments of the 
industry understand these alternatives in order to make intelligent choices. 
In the short run it is 1 iJ~ely that the SUl)port price will drop to 
appro:x:ima !:;ely $3 .10 per hundredweight on April 1, 1962. To those in the 
industry and with inventory on hand, the risk of holdtng it is ~uite 
high. 
From the longer run point of view the problems confronting the dairy 
industry are extremely bothersome especially in light of their cost to 
the general public. Expenditures during the past year for dairy support 
amounted to approximately :~500,000,000.00. It is unlikely that such ex-
penditures can continue to be made for a single commodity without some 
assurance of future improvements. For this reason there is today intense 
interest in proGrarr1s for 1narket expansion or supply control. 
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.Most cont1·oversy surrounds the vo.r:i.ous proposals for supply control. 
The very nature of legislation of this type has noi~ heen popular with 
most agricultural people. It is also a fact that the functions of many 
institutions would change materially if some of the proposals were adopted. 
For example, there is a proposal to set up the supply control regulations 
under the federal order system. If this were done then certainly the 
basic aims and objectives of the order program would need to be changed. 
Today orders are adopted tn markets as a means o.E' o1)ta:lnine; orderly 
marketing while under these new proposals, orders would become price 
support measures. As a price support meas~re new standards for pricing 
would need to be adopted. 
Another oft- discussed problem associated with supply control refers 
to the logistics. Should such programs be proposed and adopted on a local, 
regional or national market basis'? With the extensive movement of milk 
between markets today, the local market approach would liii:ely be difficult 
to administer. On the other hand with the extrewe variations in market 
supplies, it would be most difficult to ma.lnto.in eg_uity amone; producers 
selling to these markets. For example, in 'J. deficit marl;;:et a producer 
might find himself payine; a penalty of $2.75 on milk that would be needed 
in the market. 
For the dairy industry such proposals us land retirement can o.lso be 
quite significant. If such a program v7ere adopted it is lU;:ely to affect 
adversely the supply of milk in Ohio that would be available for manufoctur-
ing purposes. Much of this mill~ is currently being produced on fo.rms 
located in areas where land retirement would probo.bly be encourae;ed. 
Hhatever the program that is finally adopted, care must be exercised 
for the interests of the general public. Any program that might result 
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in s:l.gnHicontly higher prices to consumers needs to be vim~ed "l.·ri tb 
caution. The demand ror du.iry products has not been hold:tns and the rash 
of new substitute products ure likely to c;,.dn n finn foothold unless 
prices CLll1 be held at a competitj.vc level. Retlli'ns to producers can l)e 
affected as much by a shrinldng derm.J.nd as by an oversupply. 
These are but a rew of the issues C'cteing tbe dairy industry today. 
None of these ure insurmountoble but they do rec1uire unders·trmding. 
Decisions on a number of these issues fina.Lly h·:vvc to 'be wade especially 
considerinG the nature of !:;he J?robl8m tmd the :Lnberest:.s of the dairy in-
dustry and the general pu"blic. 
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GOVERNMJI:IIJ'l' IN FRUIT AIID VEGE'J:IABLE HARKETil;G 
Edwin J. Royer 
Historically, there nas been lesn direct government involve-
ment in marketinG in the fruits and ve;;;eto.ll.e industry than with other 
seements of agriculture. 
Fruit and vecete.ble producers until now have been able to 
handle the ma.rket,i!l8 of their crops in a profitable and orderly man-
ner, with only a few exceptions. Followinc; Horld vla.r II, a price 
support program wa.s in effect for potatoes. Occdsiona.lly lvhen a colll-
modity has been in ex:cess supply, some diverBion purcluses by the fed-
elnal government have been made. This was true for stored winter cab-
bage in 1959 and ha.s occurred with potatoes in several dreas (but not 
in Ohio) in recent years. Last fall, the federul government purchased 
applesauce for the school lunch program for the first time. 
Marketing a.gree1r1ent and order procrams as authorized b,1- the 
.Agricultural Marketing .Agreer,1ent Act of 1937 plus subsequent amend-
ments have been used to provide more orderly nw.rketing for certain 
commodities and areas. Currently, there are forty marketing orders 
in effect in the u.s. for twenty- sj.x separate fruits and vegetables. 
Ohio has never been included in any marketing agreement or order pro-
gram_, primarily because Ohio is a deficit producer for every major 
fruit or vegetable grmm within the state, with the possible exception 
of greenhouse tonatoes. 
Presently, hearings are being held for potato growers to con-
sider a national potato marketing agreement and order. This is the 
first fruit or vegetable commodity to be affected by an order on a 
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nationdl basis. Until the p~ss~ge of the 19ul Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, the areas to be covered by this type of progrcl.m w..1s inter-
preted to be the sm~lest region or practicable producing area. It 
is now possible for :m.'J.l'lceting agreement r:md order prosrams to be 
applied to the entire nation. 
An interesting feature of the proposed national potato marketing 
order and a.£;reement is that it provides for volume marketing aJ.lotments 
which in practice will be about the same thing as marketing quotas. If' 
a referendum is held and is favored by two-thirds of those voting or 
two-thirds of the production volume voted, a rncrketing allotment can 
be made for each individual grower. The proposal in the case of pot~ 
toes would be for allotments based on a hitorical production period 
using the average of the highest two out of three years preceding the 
current marketing year, but excluding the year 1)!62 for all calcula,. 
tions. This is a significant cho.nge from marketing orders currently 
in effect. In all previous orders, the amount r:m individual could 
market was based on ·t;:;_1e current year's production and was noli cal-
culated from a historical production period, 
Since Ohio has a lart3e population, is a deficit fruit and veg-
etable production area, and h..ls tra.nsportu.tional. advantages due to 
the location of consumers, it might be logically inferred that Ohio 
fruit and vegetable producers would gain less than many other states 
from a national marketing program for any fruit ~r vegetable, It is 
quite possible chat outlets for Ohio grown fruits and vegetables may 
be restricted by reaulations contained in national rmarketine orders 
and agreements. 
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HIPLICATIONS OF NEW PROGRA.I'-'IS 
FOR OHIO HARKETIIJG MANAGERS SYl,IPOSIUM 
Genero.l 
Mervin G. Smith 
First of all, I think we need a farm pro3ram. vle need good farm 
policies. I say this first because \-Then one critizes some points of 
farm programs, it is sometimes interpreted that we are a-gainst d.ll farm 
programs. 
My part on this program is to emphasize some General points for con-
sideration in farm policies: 
1. We must Give much more consideration in farm pro6r~ms to the 
effects on foreign relations and foreign trade. In fact, some time in 
the future we must coordinate our farm policies with those policies of 
other nations. We must be concerned about this immediately in connec-
tion with the European Common Market. Unless we keep our agriculture 
efficient and competitive pricewise, both our foreign trade and our 
foreign relatlons will suffer. This is crucial in the next few years 
as we attempt to coordinate policies with the European countries which 
are the most important clients for our agricultural exports. 
2. He have not given enough attention to the adjustment of re-
sources in ugriculture. Our emphasis has been more on prices. The 
labor or human resource has been neglected and the supreme goal of our 
policy is for the benefit of the human being. More recently there is 
some evidence of interest pa-rticularly in the adjustment of the land 
resource and some on the hU1lld.n resource. Here again we are misinter-
preted when we say that we need less h~ resources in agriculture, 
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I do not believe tlut ruwone s:1ould be ldcked out of cLgriculture. No 
one should move out unless hi.s situa-cion is improved by doing so. 
3· Not enouc,h emphasis is t:,iven to efficiency d.nd flexibility 
in agriculture in om fc..nn pror_;rams. I£' ... mythin...;, some people imply 
that •re dlre.).dy ...t.re too efficient. I tl1i11k we .J.re likely to lull our-
selves into compl.::Lcenc;y .J.nd weaken our whole COllpetitive system and 
productivity in thin country compared with the Communist countries 
unless we still ernplla.size efficiency u.nd flexib llity in our ivhole 
agricultural or,:;aniza.tj on. For example, I think it would be a mistake 
to slmJ down the shifts in resources bet11een fd.rms or the shifts in 
the type of f ..:1.rming from one region to J.notner which nrust t..l.k.e place 
as proc;ress in teclmolouy is 1n..J.de. Some of our progrdms tend to slow 
this down or almost prevent these adjust1nents that are almost inevitable. 
4. Some proc;rwflS ..1re beint; proposed wHhout lmowinc; or an..llyzing 
the full consequences of such proc;rcLms or the problems which would be 
confronted wlth adrn.inisterinG these pro.;rams. For exo.mple, I do not 
believe J. very Good <1n.1J.ysis 11as been mJ.de on the cost.s o.nd problems 
of adnrl.nistl~..:~.tion i-1::1iC11 would be encountered viith ndtional marketing 
quotJ.s. itlE' should be t.1.ble to anticipate dnd solve m:l.ny of these prob-
lems before we co too fcJ.r in decidi.nt., this method or policy. 
5. Not enoU£.,h ...;,ttcntion has been c;iven to the vJJ.ue and effect 
of fu.rm pro0ram.s in the long run. 111ost of the eval11a.tion of prosrarns 
and the decisions made in regu.rd bo them seem to me to have been nude 
from a very short run1 o.ud perh~~.ps no.rrow; viewpoint. The long- run effect 
of such progrd.ms may be more important than the short run. In the long 
run the whole structure of a{~riculture co.n be influenced and this could 
influence the whole position of J.grlculture in this country as well as 
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the whole economy of this country in rel,J.tion to other world powers. 
6. .More resea.rch analysts needs to be mJ.de of all fd.rm pro-
grams and proposals. Likewise, much more economic education needs 
to be conducted on them. With all the lnterest th<J.t we h.a.ve had 
in the farm program it is reaJ.ly surprisinc, that we have had such a 
sma.ll amount of research on them. We need, and can have; improved farm 
programs with much more research .a.nd analysis of proGrams and much more 
educational work on the principles involved. 
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FREE VS. CONTROLLED MARKETS FOR AGRICULTURE* 
Max E. Brunk 
Professor of Marketing 
Cornell University 
Everyone today is locking for more market power. It is a dynamic subject 
among businessmen, labor unions and farmers alike. Within agriculture it's 
the style --- everyone is for it --- it is one issue on which all far.m organi-
zations can agree. Market power implies a degree of industry control over 
price and it is assumed, with a certain amount of naivete, that higher price 
means higher income. Certainly after 30 years of experience we should know 
the folly of attempting scarcity pricing in an atmosphere of abundance. True 
market power lies in controlling the factors affecting price and not in mani-
pulating price itself. 
Now the title of my talk implies that I am going to extol the virtues of 
a free market versus a controlled market. It can be argued that there is no 
greater market power than that derived from a free market. There is an abun-
dance of evidence that the free market brings about needed adjustments in re-
sources applied to agriculture more effectively and quickly than any other 
scheme yet devised by man. Indeed few of you would disagree that the most 
effective cure for 10-cent ho6s or dollar-a-bushel apples is 10-cent hogs and 
dollar apples. While I might argue that the free market is no more brutal than 
the slow death cures of a politically controlled economy, many of us are un-
willing to effect a cure by killing off the weakest patients. Instead we are 
much more inclined to accept a partial cure and even to some extent live with 
the after-effects of a partial remedy. But the choice of low prices or con-
trolled markets is not the only alternative facing American agriculture al-
though our actions during recent generations would seem to so indicate. 
* Fburth Annual Agricultural Marketing Conference at Columbus, Ohio on 
March 15, 1962. 
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I shall argue that this is a false dichoto~y for either extreme is un-
realistic in agriculture todRy. I shall argue that certain types of controls 
are essential to orderly markeving while others are inconsistent. I shall also 
be concerned with ~ho should have the responsibility of these so-called con-
trols --" agriculture or government. 
Certainly it doesn't take much of an analyst in looking at the present 
workings of our economy to conclude that farmers have little voice in deter-
mining the prices they receive for their products. In fact the control far-
mers have over price or the factors affecting price is so remote that one can 
openly advocate many forms of monopolistic action in agriculture without fear 
of criticism. Even on the buying side farmers pay quoted prices. True they 
may argue about the price of feed or fertilizer. They may even haggle a bit 
over the price of a new tractor, but in the final analysis they pay quoted 
prices. This lack of power over price, either buying or selling, does not 
exist to the same degree in any other major sector of our economy. 
To a greater degree industry sets the prices at wbich its products will 
be sold. Industry even exercises extensive power over the prices of its raw 
products. Labor goes a long way in stipulating the wages it receives and 
effectively uses market power to force many fringe benefits. Now I will be 
the first to admit that things always look greener on the other side of the 
fence -- that there is a tendency to overvalue the accomplishments of industry 
and labor in commanding desired prices. Labor or industry commands no more of 
a secret weapon tban agriculture in forcing its product on the consumer but it 
is true that industry and labor have been able to exercise a greater degree of 
supply management than our highly decentralized agriculture. The degree of 
supply management seems to be related to the level of concentration or organi-
zation. 
-33-
Broadly speaking, market power is sought in many ways, but chiefly it is 
acquired by means of manipulating supply and demand through the instrument of 
organization. SUch organization may take many forms. It may vary all the 
way from government created monopolies to informal groups of voluntary mem-
bers. At any one time within a given industry there may exist a number of 
independent structures all directed at the attainment of greater market power. 
They all seek to enhance economic returns for their principals. 
While it is true that agriculture has used this means to gain market 
power it has not been highly successful in reaching its objectives for a num-
ber of basic reasons. These I need not belabor before an audience of well in-
formed agricultural leaders and market operators. Nevertheless the failures 
of agriculture to establish a reasonable degree of market power voluntarily, 
has led to all sorts of government programs designed to do for farmers what 
they have been unable to do for themselves. But there is a vast difference in 
the effects of market power established by industry or government. The former 
entails a responsibility which the latter does not. With industry control, 
price concepts are quickly translated into value or income concepts while with 
government control price concepts reign supreme. Under entrepreneurial con-
trol the principals making a decision must bear the financial responsibility 
of the results, be they good or bad. Their only alternative is to respond to 
the dictates of consumers. But under government control, payments are made to 
farmers for services rendered to government -- not to the market. In a sense 
considerations of consumption are made subservient to production. 
It is important to recognize that any industry which exerts a high degree 
of internal control over either production or distribution also exercises a 
degree of monopolistic power which runs counter to true concepts of a free 
market. But so long as the pricing mechanism is left free the taskmaster is 
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the consumer and every market manipulation that yields rewards is based on this 
consideration. When this responsibility is removed through the instrument of 
government subsidy programs we begin to lose market perspective. The channels 
of communication between producer and consumer become garbled with the static 
of political issues. We begin to seek expedient solutions as well as solutions 
designed to remedy the after-effects of preceding programs. We soon find our-
selves subscribing to actions which ignore or have little relevance to the 
dictates of the market taskmaster -- the consumer. 
Implicit in the workings of a competitive economy is an equality of bar-
gaining power among buyers and sellers. The ability to exercise control over 
supply, demand or cost depends greatly on the level and effectiveness of the 
organizational structure attained within a given industry. When competitive 
advantage is gained by any one group, we see upward or downward pressures on 
price depending on whether that group is buyer or seller. This results in 
organizational counter-measures by the group which has lost relative power. 
This is the position in which agriculture finds itself today -- a position of 
trying to build an integrated series of' organizational counter-measures. 
The effectiveness of this effort will depend on the ability of' agriculture 
and its free market agents to identify common goals, to achieve concerted 
action and to establish a well balanced mix of marketing activities. In iden-
tifying goals it is important for agriculture never to lose sight of the fact 
that it can maximize income in the long run only by producing products needed 
and wanted in the marketplace. No other goal can be consistent with the 
philosophy on which our economy is structured. The injection of government 
subsidy into the picture makes it increasingly difficult for both far-mers and 
market agents to res:pond to the dictates of the consumer. The pricing mechanism, 
which is the communication line between consumer and producer, becomes confused 
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with other considerations. But government programs are not the only forces of 
distortion. Farmers themselves often fall into the trap of thinking that con-
sumers should buy those products which farmers like to produce. The graveyard 
is full of farmer cooperatives which have tried to sell what their members want 
to produce rather than what the market wants. The very same farmers who have 
trouble understanding why such cooperatives fail will join a purchasing co-
operative and insist that it buys what they want rather than what industry wants 
to sell. FOrtunately private market operators provide effective competition for 
such efforts so that such production oriented farmer cooperatives face the al-
ternative of failing or becoming market oriented. 
Government can be of its greatest service to agriculture in helping to 
establish a favorable atmosphere for effective organizational structures needed 
in a well balanced marketing mix. In a world of big business characterized 
by large scale buying and concentration of processing, handling and distribu-
tion, farmers recognize they can do little to manipulate supply or demand or 
effect operational efficiencies without collective action of some kind. Past 
efforts in some cases has led to outright government programs designed to 
maintain or raise prices and in other cases it has led to the formation of 
larger scale purchasing and sales organizations as well as farmer controlled 
bargaining associations. Increasing interest has developed in these latter 
types of organization because the prices generated under past attempts to 
artificially manipulate prices have not produced desired results. There has 
been dissatisfaction with existing farm programs which some consider inadequate, 
ineffective or undesirable. There is also a preference by some farmers for 
private action over government action. Unfortunately a philosophy has developed 
that any specific effort to give farmers greater market power is either a clear 
cut government program or a clear cut industry program. In reality many 
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effective structures can be established only by the concerted action of agri-
culture and government. 
The past century has witnessed numerous attempts on the part of farmers 
to organize large-scale cooperatives or associations in an effort to counter 
the market power of meat packers, milk dist~ibutors, processors and handlers. 
You are well acquainted vdth the ambitious Sapiro movement of the 1920ts which 
resul·ted in the formation of national livestock, tobacco, and grain cooperatives. 
Within a few years these organizations collapsed simply because they could not 
prevent their members from selling outside the organization despite "iron-clad" 
contracts. Loyal members simply found that they could not afford to hold the 
price umbrella over non-members and there was no instrument by which compliance 
could be forced on non-members. 
On the other hand, with market 9rders this fundamental weakness is recog-
nized in that orders are binding on all producers when a substantial majority 
vote to use this device. Thus government action facilitated and indeed made 
practical the use of market orders as producer-controlled programs. But now 
we are witnessing a shift in power even with this instrument so that it too is 
threatened to be laden with political considerations not consistent with the 
basic goal of agriculture -- the philosophy of a market oriented economy. 
Admittedly, I have oversimplified the picture. Organizational structure 
~!!on the seller!s part is not the only way of offsetting the market power 
of organizational structUl4 es created by buyers. In many instances organized 
buying power might be wholly or partially offset by greater productive efficiency 
of the individual. There can be little doubt but that this is what has been 
taking place in agriculture. But there is rather strong evidence that the 
gains in efficiency by many producers have not been great enough to offset the 
market power which the buyer has acquired through organizational structure. 
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When there is trouble there must always be a scapegoat who generally gets 
the blame for a lot more trouble than he creates. It hasn't been many years 
since farmers thought they could solve their marketing problems through the 
instrument of rigid grading standards. Periodically someone jumps on the open 
exchanges and the speculator. Today the whipping boy is the large scale cen-
tralized buyer. Personally I believe there is a very decided risk of over-
emphasizing the amount of market power which buyers have acquired. Yet I think 
it is just as fallacious to maintain that no relative gains in power have been 
made. Certainly large scale buyers are no better able than fa11ner marketing 
cooperatives to force abundant supplies on the consumer at scarcity prices. 
All the market power in the world will not do that. 
At this stage it seems appropriate to ask the question. If organizational 
structures have given buyers a little more market power, why can't this same 
power be offset by sellers using this same device? Now I am not implying that 
changes in organizational structure have not been taking place within agriculture. 
We see them occurring all about us. However, the degree of market power gained 
by agriculture through this device has been less than that gainea by either 
business groups or labo~. ~~at is there about agriculture and its market 
channels that keeps it behind in the struggle for market power? I think we may 
find part of the answer by looking at the characteristics which give organiza-
tional structures their market power. 
First, it must be relatively difficult to get into and out of business. 
There are many barriers to freedom of entry. Some are economically generated 
while others find their origin in the political considerations of trade groups 
or government. Capital requirements make it difficult for just anyone to be-
come an automobile manufacturer. App~enticeship requirements keep me from 
fixing my neighbor's plumbing, Educational requirements keep some of us from 
practicing law or medicine. Building codes protect the electrician. Licens-
ing may keep some of us out of the liquor business. On the other hand, agri-
culture has established relatively few barriers to entry. If almost any group 
in agriculture is successful in negotiating higher prices, we find an almost 
tmmediate shift of new producers and resources into that sector. 
Secondly, many of our most powerful marketing structures exist in in-
dustries which have few producers. The ~ller the number of producers, the 
easier it is for them to come to agreement on issues involving price and in-
come ]?Olicies. Again agriculture has poor qualifica.t.::f.ons on this score. Not 
only do we have many producers of given products within agriculture but also 
we have strong competition among the producers of alternative products. In 
addition these producers are scattered geographically. Producers of apples in 
california and in New York face different problems in both production and mar-
keting. Small wonder they have difficulty in agreement. They simply don't see 
things in the same light. And even if they were able to agree to withhold 
supplies to effect a better price the producers of peaches stand ready to step 
in the void and capture a share of the abandoned market. 
Third, I list the importance of having strong alternative uses of product 
or resources. Certainly there is more ability to withhold products from mar-
ket if they can be diverted to alternative uses. In this way much of the 
financial pressure is removed. A cherry producer with cherries ready for har-
vest finds little he can do with his product if he doesn't sell in tbe establish-
ed market. Even from year to year he has problems in getting his cherry trees 
to ~educe anything other than cherries. 
Fburth, .we find that market power and large financial resources go to-
gether. Large financial reserves enable many industries to vreather tbe storms 
of excess inventories vrhich are built up in an over-anticipation of market 
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demands. Likewise, market power is often attained via the route of integra-
tion. To a degree industry gets agreement with dollars while farmers must 
depend largely on organization of people to do the job. Being able to buy into 
the marketing mechanism in order to force your beliefs into practice requires 
money -- the kind of dollars frequently missing from agricultural organizations. 
Last on my list is the degree of price-making activities which government 
will sanction in a given industry. With all its inherent disadvantages in 
building organizations with some reasonable degree of market power, agriculture 
has at least faced relatively few problems of antitrust. To some extent govern-
ment can and has used exemptions from antitrust laws to help counterbalance the 
power of other groups to which collusion tends to come naturally. But we can 
expect that government will go only so far in this respect before it encounters 
the wrath of the consumer. 
In attempting to structure our agricultural market organizations in the 
future, it is important that we give pa~ticular attention to these characteris-
tics. In spite of these handicaps, I sincerely believe that agriculture is 
just beginning to exploit some of the market power of business organization. 
Recognizing the general attitudes farmers have regarding labor unions~ I hesi-
tate to draw an analogy between agriculture and labor. However, it is there. 
If we will look at the labor movement and its achievements over the past half 
century, we will readily see that all the things on my list really give greater 
handicap to labor than to agriculture in developing market power. I sincerely 
believe that the ingenuity of the American farmer can seek out solutions just 
as labor bas done, and I do not by any stretch of the imagination mean to im-
ply that agriculture should or will need to follow the pattern set by the labor 
movement. 
In fact, the pattern to be followed by agriculture is fairly well established 
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It consists of a hybrid -- the parents of which are the devices used by in-
dustry on th0 one hand and labor on the other. This pattern includes among 
other things three distinct types of market organizations. They are: 
1. Sales Organizations. 
2. Ba.rgaining Asoociations. 
3. Market Development Associations. 
To a very great extent, the success of any one of these in achieving mar-
ket power depends largely on the existence of the others. This lack of balance 
accounts for many failures. Before comment~ng briefly on each I want to make it 
perfectly clear that these three devices alone are not powerful enough to solve 
the surplus problems of agriculture created by the artificial prices of govern-
ment support programs. However, the judicious use of these devices will serve 
to lessen the need for such programs, thus restoring to the price mechanism the 
function of reflecting the wants of consumers. 
Sales Organizations 
Real power in marketing as in production comes from ownership. If farmers 
are to gain significant price-mak1ng power, they must get into the business of 
marketing and exercise control over the distribution of their products. Grad-
ually we are seeing this take place. Certainly it is not to be accomplished 
overnight. 
The development of sound cooperatives ca~ls for far more than getting the 
religion. It requires capital, the full confidence of members, good mana&ement, 
efficient operation and established market outlets. To be worth their salt 
they must be able to do the job better than competing structures. These things 
dontt just happen. They are built over time with all the skills and ingenuity 
of :man. 
I well recognize tha·t many of you operate marketing businesses which are 
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in direct competition with farmer owned cooperatives, and where they are giving 
you real competition I well appreciate your attitudes concerning them. Again 
I may be altruistic in my thinking but I believe that both profit and coopera-
tive organizations can establish formal working relationships.in such a way 
as to capitalize on the inherent advantages of each. We have recently seen 
such structures emerge, and in the future I think we will see more of them. 
The Welch grape orga~ization and Curtice-Burns in New York and the Minu~e Maid 
structure in Florida demonstrate different ways that private business has made 
advantageous use of cooperative organization. Fbl:' the cases in point cooperative 
structure is used to facilitate financing and stability of raw product supplies 
while corporate profit structure is used to insure effective management and 
efficiency of operation. 
I am convinced that many farmer cooperatives can and should establish 
formal working relationships with private business for their mutual benefit. 
Such arrangement will yield stronger market organizations than mergers among 
either cooperatives or private business because it accomplishes mo~e than mere 
economies of scale. 
I personally believe that tJie establishm.:-nt of sound marketing structures 
will go a long way in giving agriculture tte market power it seeks and needs. 
Again I believe that government can get a little piece of the agricaltural 
burden off its back by doing more to encourage the establishment of such struc-
tures. Even though many fanners are not yet ready to get into the full swing 
of the marketing game I believe they will gradually turn to various tor.ms Of 
marketing organization in their struggle to gain market power. The rate of 
development will in large measure be determined by the attitudes and activity 
of government relative to this type of business organization. 
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Bargaining Associations 
The history of bargaining association activity in agriculture is at best 
a mottled one. There have been some limited successes and there have been many 
failures. Some of our large cooperative marketing associations today started 
out as bargaining associations. They soon realized that it takes more than just 
desire or threats to gain true market power. As a result it was found necessary 
to gain some degree of control over marketing and distribution and hence they were 
forced into the handling, processing and selling of farm products. 
On the other hand, we have some exsmpJ.es of bargaining associations which 
have operated successfully over a number of years. Their success seems to 
hinge more on a recognition of the limits of their power than on the production 
of spectacular results. These associations have helped strengthen the hands of 
farmers through negotiating for favorable terms of contract -~ terms which are 
of mutual interest to the handler as well as to the producer. Their only 
significant success in price manipulation has been when there is an allied mar~ 
ket structure such as a market order or strong marketing fil~ which exercises a 
degree of control over supplies. 
I believe the day is not far off when we will see a national network of 
bargaining associations in agriculture. Such a structure would solve many of 
the problems which weaken the influence of small local associations. With many 
products there is need for the exchange of information on a national scale ~~ 
again an activity beyond the raach of local associations. A national structure 
could provide leadership guidance, specialists in negotiation, legal counsel, 
informational services and public relations. Such a structure would serve to 
develop a mutual interest by producers within commodity groups as well as be-
tween commodity groups; and I might add that anything which will facilitate 
resource adjustments among commodity groups will contribute to market power. 
-43-
The greatest pitfall in creating such a structure is that of attempting to 
exercise too much power without simultaneously developing adequate controls over 
supply or demand. We have seen such failures in the past 1 the most col.orful of 
which was the Sa.piro Movement. It is very ap:Pf3.rent that a.ny successful bargain-
ing effort on the part of agriculture must b~ accompanied by strong controls 
over both supply and ease of entry. ~oth market orders and licensing are needed 
allies and it is here where government can assist agriculture in per.mitting the 
creation of limited trusts. 
In approaching bargaining it is important that farmers and mar!tet agents 
work together for their own mutual interest in establishing the strongest 
possible market for their product. Certainly experiences of the past wo~td 
indicate that there are no excess dollars in marketing margins which can be 
siphoned off by farmers. 'J'he only material gains to be derived are those com-
ing from effective supply management. 
Market Development Associati~ 
As previously stated, it is important for agriculture never to lose sight 
of the fact that it can maximize income in the long run only by producing pro-
ducts needed and wanted in the marketplace, 
While the potential power of sales organization lies in the area of 
efficient operation and supply control, farmers must look to ways of expanding 
the demand for their products. Market development associations are the chief 
organizational media used to this end. I include in this category what are 
commonly referred to as trade associations, commodity organizations and farm 
organizations generally. 
If we will look about us 1 we will see few industries indeed which possess 
any appreciable degree of market pover which do not enjoy a dominan·t trade or 
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promotion or market development association. Such associations historically 
have been a medium through which the really new ideas of an industry are born. 
Many successful businesses today are the product of the deliberations of industry 
associations. :aeyond this, market developnent associations serve to protect 
their members from the abuses of government on the one hand and gain favor from 
it on the other. And traditionally such associations have been the chief media 
for both industry public relations and product promotion. 
Farmers in general have been slow to participate actively in market develop-
ment e.ssociations. As we develop our market pm.rer 1 we cannot afford to neglect 
the development of good, sound and active associations. In doing this it is 
important that we develop strong cross-commodity associations in order to attain 
the greatest market power. Single commodity associations develop strong vested 
interests which tend to resist the dictates of the market. When such commodities 
lose favor in the marketplace singular commodity associations have no alternative 
than to resist and their only effective way of resisting is to turn to government 
as an artificial market for their products. More and more we a.re seeing agricul-
tural commodity groups running to government for help just as soon as a crisis 
appears. It's high time that we develop structures which will serve to remove 
the pressures of maintaining the status ~· An association is no different than 
a farmer - the strongest are those who have the greatest alternatives when a 
market dries up. 
Summary 
In summary, solutions to the problem of gaining greater market power in 
agriculture lie in the twilight zone between a free and a controlled market. 
Market power in agriculture can be gained by replacing those government controls 
which serve to directly distort the pricing mechanism. Replacement should be 
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made with industry and government controls that are consistent with market 
demands. To this end government can be of its greatest service to agriculture 
as well as the consuming public by providing a. favorable elima.te for the organi-
zation and operation of marketing institutions in which farmers have a. greater 
voice. Furthermore government action can help provide a solution to some of 
the inherent weaknesses in such agricultural organizations. There are basically 
three forms of marketing organizations through which farmers can gain market 
power -- bargaining associations, sales organizations incorporating the features 
of both cooperative and profit type businesses and market development associa-
tions. They are not substitutes for one another, but rather each makes a con~ 
tribution to the other's success. 
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D~nicl 1. Pddberg 
Tb.e structure of the milk producing indust-ry has in most markets 
been changing to fewer producel's and lal•ger producers. This industry 
has also been grovTing in size as measured by total market volume. 
Because of increasing market volume relative to demand, milk product 
&urpluses have bec~e an expensive problem nationally. National policy 
to reduce the surplus problem is currently being formulated alcng the 
lines of some sort of supply management. This policy will require ad~ 
justments of individual milk producers. Out of this complex of 
problems - 2 issues arise: 
1. What type of public policy can best achieve the supply 
management goals of the present admir.ist:::·ation? 
2. V.Jhat effect will this 11polic:y of restriction" bl3.ve upon 
deci:::dons concerning t:t.e future adjustments necesf:la.ry 
for individual producers. 
In order to make good cle~isir·ns in buth the public and private 
sector:3 of' OlU' eco~1or.ay, much i>"J.i':>rmation io req_tdred. This pa:per 
reports research currently being conducted at Ohio State University 
concerning the nature of adjustment patterns o:f' m:l lk :producers itl the 
Columbus milk shed during the 1950·1960 period. By understanding th3 
environment in 'Fhich these economic units operate and the way they 
respond to chang3s in this environment 1 '\Ie may be able to provide in-
formation useful in making improved policy decisions publicly and 
privately. 
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I. Analysis of Structure of Colu.."!lbus Flu~ d Jft.ilk Prr;•:Jucing Industry. 
First the changes in structure or ·t.b.is industry cauaed by the 
adjustments of indivio.ual producers during th~ 1950-1960 :pe:rlod will 
be studied. In order to measuxe chanses in the size-distribution of 
these producers, pounds or G~ace A milk marketed per month was observed.~/ 
Figure 1 shows the size distribution of Columbus !•1arket milk producers 
in 19501 1955 and 1960. Size categories s.re defined as follows: 
1 = producers delivering less than 21 000# of milk per month, 
2 = producers delivering 2,000 to 2,999# of milk per month, 
3 = 31000 to 4,999, 
4 = 5,000 to 6,999, 
5 = 7, 000 to 9,999, 
6 = 10,000 to 13,999, 
7 = 14,000 to 19,999, 
8 = 20,000 to 29,999, 
9 = producers delivering 301 000# per month or more. 
Category 10 is used for the number of entrants and exits 
during the base period under consideration. 
It may be noticed that in 1950 and 1955 the largest number of producers 
"ivere in the smaller size groups. The most common slze in these years 
was a monthly production of between 7,000 and 10,000 pounds of milk. 
Also in both of these years the number of producers delivering more 
!/ The volume marketed duriLg the month of September is used as 
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than 20,000 pounds of milk per month was r~la.tbrely small -- 3.1% in 
1950 and 8.3% in 1955. The number of pr-oducers in the market declined 
slightly from 2,256 in 1950 to 2,216 in 1955.g/ 
In the 1955-1960 period the shift of producers from smaller to 
larger size groups, had accelerated. By 1960 tr.e most common size is 
between 10,000 and 13,999 pounds of milk and producers delivering over 
20,000 pounds of milk monthly had increased to 22.7% of all producers. 
l 1he numbex· of producers by 1960 had drcp:pad to 1,823. 
These statiotics show the aggregative growth patterns which we 
have become familiar with in t:hia industry as in others -- a trend to 
fewer and larger firms. Some questions arise out of this industry ad-
~justment patterns, b.o'\veve:t4 : What has hap:pened in terms of adjustment of 
individual producers? Have the little ones gone out of business to 
be replaced by bigger untts or have the smaller ones gr~m larger or 
both? If individual producers continue in their present growth patterns 
where will this lead us? 
In order to conduct a systematic investigation of the dynamic 
e.specto of this in•lust:ry, the growth of each p:ro1ucer is observed. 
For example, Table 1 shows movements of produc~ers from one ca.tego1•y 
to another which resulted from their decisions to increase or decrease 
production between 1950 and 1955· F'or example 1 in 1950, 455 of the 
Columbus milk producers were in Category 3 -- that is, producing 
2' 
_/ This number of producers in tbe market runs slightly higher than 
data reporced by the office of the Market Ad.n;inistrator because farmers 
marketing their milk jointly are counted as two units in the present 
al:'.J3.l.ys1a rathG:r than as a· partnsrsll.ip .. 
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TABL'E l . MILK PRODUCER GROVTTH PATTERNS, 
COLUM.."BUS MARKET, 
1950-1955· 
S1ze 'i/ in 6 8 ~gory 1950 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 10 
1 62 0 5 7 7 3 lj. 1 0 1 34 
2 133 8 15 18 16 7 6 2 0 2 59 
3 455 13 13 75 52 56 21 9 0 0 216 
4 483 8 8 45 65 70 45 15 2 1 221+ 
5 521 8 8 30 55 87 70 45 10 4 204 
6 340 2 0 6 21 LJO 53 56 23 3 136 
7 191 1 0 2 4 12 23 39 25 6 79 
8 51 0 0 1 0 2 3 6 15 8 16 
9 20 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 7 10 
10 25)790~ 22 39 117 143 216 183 141 62 15 24)852 
~~ in 
1955 28)046 62 88 301 364 493 408 315 138 47 25,830 
Entrants = 938 Ex.ant s = 973 
~ This category represents potential entrants. The to·Lal number of farms 
reported in the 1959 Census of Agriculture in the 17 county area serving 
the Columbus market was used to represent this potential. 
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TABLE 2 . MILK PRODUCER GRO'VJTH PATJ:ERNS, 
COLUMBUS MARKET, 
1955-1960 
.1 • Size It 1n 
Category 1955 1 2 3 ~ 5 6 't 8 9 10 
1 62 0 1 4 2 3 3 0 0 0 49 
2 88 4 5 5 2 2 0 2 1 1 66 
3 301 10 13 27 28 21 10 2 5 1 184 
4 364 6 11 39 22 27 3~- 13 10 0 202 
5 493 3 7 24 25 60 62 33 16 2 261 
6 408 0 4 9 19 30 52 51 36 13 194 
7 315 1 2 4 7 20 34 38 43 13 153 
8 138 1 0 2 1 3 5 15 34 26 51 
9 47 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 5 12 23 
10 25,790~ 19 21 57 77 137 158 151 96 74 25,000 
II in 
1960 28,oo6 44 6l.J. 171 183 303 361 309 246 142 26,183 
Entrants = 'T90 Exants = 1183 
~ This category represents potential entrants. TI1e total number of farms 
reported in the 1959 Census of Agriculture in the 17 county area serving the 
Columbus market was used to represent this potential. 
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between 3,000 and 4,999 pC'unC.s of mille. '!.'be numb~rs in the Category 3 
row of Table 1 show what had b~~~ened to tbese producers by 1955. 
Thirteen went to Category 1, 13 went to Category 2, 75 remained in 
Category 3, etc. The number in column 10, in this case 216, inJicated 
the number of producers within this group who had gone out of business 
by 1955. Table 2 shows similar data far the 1955-1960 period. 
It ia possible to compute probabilities of growth by dividing the 
numbers of producers moving to various other categories by the initial 
number of producero in a particular size category. If we assume that 
this pattern of g1·owth represents the adjustment of producers to the 
changing nature of their environment and that these responses would be 
expected to continue, it is possible to use these probabilities of 
growth to predict adjustment patterns for the future. The development 
of complex mathematical methods of analys:l.s and the availability of 
electronic computing and data pro~essing systems make it possible to 
evalua·t.e the aggregate impact of the thousands of individual producers 
decisions upon the future structure of the industry.df 
T'Lle number of producers moviug from smaller size groups to larger 
sizes is decreased ao the number of smaller producers in the industry 
is reduced. Therefore, when the observed growth pattern is projected 
lnto the future it is noted that an equilibrium size distribution of 
producers is obtained. That 1~, the number cr producers moving out 
of a size category during a time pertod is equal to the number entering. 
~/ For a discussion of the analytical methods used here see D. I. 
Padberg, "The Use of VJ.S.rkov Processes in Mee..suring Changes in l-1arket 
Structure,'' Journal of Farm Economics, February 1962, pps. 189-199· 
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In Figure 2, the plain columns indicate the number of :produce1•s which 
would. be in each Gize group if' gro-:.rt b. cf th~ typ;; observed d.'.ll"i!'lg 
1950-1955 were to contir.ue indefinitely. Sioilarly, the shaded columns 
indicate the number of producers that would be in each size group if 
growth of the type observed. during 1955-1960 continued. indefinitely. 
Note that the predicted size distribution based u:pon the growth patterns 
of the 1950-1955 period sh~1s little change from the 1955 actual size 
distribution of producers. That is, firm grmrth during this period 
would not be expected to lead to a great change in the struct11re of 
the industry. 
The predicted size distribution of producers based on firm growth 
during tee 1955-1960 period shows much more change in indus·cry structure. 
The total number of producers has significantly declined and the number 
in the smaller groups has declined while the number in the large size 
groups have increased. 
Whs,t explains the diffe1•ence in growth patterns observed in these 
two periods? Many factors were likely influential in causing the tendency 
to larger and. fewer firms to be a.::cel.erated during the latter 1950's. 
Probably the adoption of bulk handling fac:Ui't'ias was among the me-re 
important of these factors affecting produ.c!ers decision to change size 
of operation. Sir1ce the aC!.option of bulk handling eg,uipment represented 
cost savings available to a greater degree for large producers than 
small producers, a tendency toward incre~seO size is created- Since 
most changes in produc·cion or handling methods amount to the substitution 
of expensive equipment for processes which vere :previously done by hand, 
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Although it is interesting to eval"Jate tlte kir.J. or induotry 
strY.cture which would emerge if observed. grcvth continued indefinite-
ly, this does not help much in planning. It would be more interesting 
to observe the kind of industry we might expect in th~ reasonably 
near future, say 1975. If these gr~dth patterns are projected to 1975, 
it is noticed that the final distribution is approac~ed, Table 3 shows 
the number of firms in each size c~tegory observed in 1950, 1955 and 
1960 along with the projections. 
Now lets summarize. what this analysis tells us about the future 
growth of the industry. Producer growth as it was observed during 
1950-1955 would have maintained an essentially stabilized induatry 
structure. Producer grow·t:;h as observed in 1955·1960 is very different 
fr~m that of 1950·1955 and will develop an ibdusbry structure with 
fewer firms and most of them in the largest size categories. The most 
common producer size in this new industry structure is a monthly pro-
duction of 10,000 to 14,000 pounds and there are more producers (763) 
larger than this most common size than the nurnbe:r of producers in smaller 
sizes ( 556). 
Is the projection of 1955-1960 growth pattern a good prediction 
of what will happen to industry structure? It is pr~bably a conservative 
prediction. Just as growth accelerated in the latter part of the 1950's 
ccmpared with 1950-1955, growth during 1960-1965 will likely continue 
to move at a still faster pace. The Columbus Market manditory adoption 
of bulk handling facilities in 1961 has already bad this effect in 
this market. 
What do these grcv1th patterns mean to producers and potential 
entrants? From these conservative estimates of future growth, we 
can get some indication of the life expectaoc,yof present producing 
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TABLE 3 . SIZE DISTiUBUTIONS OF COLUlJIBT13 M!LK 
__..;:::;...__ PRODUCERS OBSEEVED AND PP.EDIC'l~D. 
Final F:t.na.l 
1975 1975 Distribution Distribution 
based on tased on 'based on based on 
Size 1950-55 1955-60 1950-)5 1955-60 
Category 1950 1955 1960 groinh growth grc:;th growth 
1 62 62 44 48.1 32.0 49.7 31.6 
2 133 88 64 68.3 42.1 70.0 41.5 
3 455 301 171 235.8 114.6 243.0 112.9 
4 483 364 183 304.2 135.4 313·7 133·9 
5 521 !~93 303 440.3 238.2 453·9 236.0 
6 340 hoB 361 399·9 304.4 412.8 302.0 
7 191 315 309 359.4 297·9 371.7 296.2 
8 51 138 246 210.8 267.4 218.2 265.8 
9 20 47 142 106.4 200.6 108.5 200.7 
Total No. 
Producers 
in Industry 2256 2216 18~3 2173.2 1632.6 2241.5 1620.6 
--
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firms in various size categories. BaseU. on growth patterns observed 
uuring 1955-1960's, producing firms with monthly output of l~as than 
10.,000 pouncJ.s have about one chance in 21 of remaining in business until 
1975 if they remain the same size, about one chance in 13 if they in-
crease output, and in any case almost a 9 out of 10 cr.ance of going 
out of business before 1975· Chances of remaining in business are best 
in the largest two size categories an1 are roughly twice as good as in 
the smaller group. In all size groups tee Drobability of being out 
of business ls high. Table 4 sh0'\-7S tl:le probable 1975 disposition of 
current producers in each of the size categories based on projected 
grovrth of the tyre observed. during 1955-1960. For ex'3.mple, of the firms 
currently p.~1oducing 7,000 - 101 000 pounds (Categnry 5) row ~ shov113 that 
.27% of thflm will be in Category 1 in 1975, .4% will be in Cat€)gory 2 
in l975 1.1% of them v7ill be in Catego:ry 3 in 1975, etc. Eighty six 
percent of them will be out of business by 1975):/ Starting in any size 
category the chances of being out of business by 1975 is very 't.igh. 
This illustrates the high rate of turnO"'rer in this industry. 
II. :Cmplicat:i.oniJ of Ch'lne;.!.ng Ir.Clt:;F;>try Structure \Hth Respect to Supply 
Managr;mcnt Policies. 
Our s·cudy shews that this segm-snt; of the dairy producing industry 
is very clyuo.mic with a high rate of gro-t-Yth and turnove:::o among its 
constituents. In tables l and 2, the number of firms remaining in a 
size category fcrr five years was small in every cafle naver exceeding 
35% and typically less than 25%· These growth patterns also sb.ow that, 
during the five year periodo observed, almost half of the producers in 
~/ Produce-Jrs wh;~;; shifted to other mark,~ta are incluc1ed in 
this group. 
TABLE 4 PROJECTb"""D GROHTH OF EYJSTING COLUMBUS 
lV'"ARKE.r PRODUCERS BET'H~T :L96o AND 1.975 · 
Initial Size SIZE CATEGORY TIT 1975 Out of' Category 3 4 5~ h 7 __a_ 
--
g_ Busine_s_s_10 _ 
-- - -'? - -- -- -
1 .20 .29 . 75 .78 1.27 1.54 1.36 1.20 
-73 91.88 
2 .20 .29 -73 -75 1.19 1.44 1.31 1.21 .86 92.02 
3 .28 .43 1.07 1.06 1.64 1.97 1.71 1.60 
-99 89.25 
4 .29 .44 1.13 1.14 1.83 2.30 2.10 2.12 1.36 87.29 
5 .27 .. ~1 1.10 1.16 1.96 2.60 2.50 2.61 1.69 85.70 
6 .26 
-37 1.03 1.11 1.98 2.83 3.00 3-50 2.65 83.27 
7 .23 -33 -93 1.02 1.86 2.79 3-11 3.80 3-09 82.85 
8 .22 .26 .81 .89 1.72 3-07 3.86 5-20 5.10 78.$ 
9 .17 .21 .63 . 75 1.46 2.67 3.28 4.21 4.28 82.34 
10 .10 .14 
-37 .45 
-79 






the industry went cu·t; cf.' business and. 'Were replaced by entering :producP-rs. 
In an industry charaoterized by cor:.t.:'l.r.;;.ou.u char..ge in the size of 1ndi 
1l'idu.al producers a:o.d a high turnover rate, any supply management 
system involving bases or quotas must have an efficient method of trans-
ferring base. 
Supply management policies which have had some measure of su~cess 
in the past have involved market structures in which a few large stable 
firms ha,·e had a dominant position. :l.n the marketing channel. The 
sugar beet ma.rketing plans are prob:::.bly the best kno"Yn example of supply 
management which :l.s effected through the sugar refining industry 
composed of lc~ss than 20 relatively large firms. In this kin.d of 
market structure, market output is typically con·brolle:d by decisions 
of firms concerning their individual output. Supply management in such 
a situat;ion simply involve~::~ the government ,join1.ng in this decision 
process and provi(ling enabling legislature to allocate this output 
level among farmero. 
This type of pulicy is not applicable to the fluid milk producing 
industry. Fluid milk ha.nr.Ucrr, numbe:t• in the thousands and much milk 
goes direc~tly from producer to const~mt::r. Pt.ilic:l.es which he.ve been 
presente<l to manage the supply of fluid milk susgest d1.rect regulation 
of individual producers. 
The fluid milk producing industry is a competitive industry. 
In such an :l.ndust:ry, structure producers do not decide how much should 
be marketed and adjust th~ir inuividual outpat accordingly. Rather 
they consider themselves too small to seriously aff'ect marl-tet output 
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and proceed to produce the output most r.rofit~ble for them at cur~ent 
prices. Market output is t.hetl ud.,ju:rC.ed by t~'\e entory and exit of' these 
small producing units. 
Supply managementa in the dairy industry is an attempt to control 
market output the way it is typically controlled by oligopolistic 
firms. This is not meant to imDlY that such r.olicy is not feasable. 
Rather, it is meant ·to point out that supply management in this industry 
would be a different process than supply management in cases where it 
may be implew.mted through an oligcpclistic structure. By ts.!dng 
account of this difference more appropriate policy may be developed. 
There is every reason to believe that the growth of producers has 
befgn related to increased oparating efficiency o:f' the iniustry as 
well as being profitable for the individQal producer. This is n~t 
meant to imply that increasing size will guarantee'more efficient 
production. In some cases, howe7er, larger size is required bafore 
more efficient handling techniques are profitable. If supply management 
policies have the effect of restricting these growth opportunities for 
the future, increaseG :r.:o. the prod'l~tivity rates fOl1 farm operators may 
be elimlna.tsd vhich 'WOllld ha.ve an adverse effect on produ.cer income as 
well as consumer welfare. 
In conclusion I would like to offer the following com~ents: 
1. The size of producer has increased significantly since 1950 
and this trend tmvard la~ger size may be expacteu to 
continue. 
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2. If our resea!'ch deYoted tcrward increasing technical 
efficiency is success:Z'nl an.d results in develcping equip-
ment to replace processes previously done by hand, 
further increases in prcdu~arslze may be required if 
these more efficient techniques are tc be adopted. 
3. The milk producing inrlustry ag we know it today is m1:1.d.e 
up of individual producing units which have a short life 
ex:pectaney and 1-1hich are continually changing in size. 
This very competitive environment creates an opportunity 
for individl~ls to expand and take advantage of technical 
advances which may improve their profits and increase 
industry efficiency. 
4. It is important to assure that supply t1anagemen:c policies 
do not seriously restrict the freedom of entry, exit and 
individual firm growth in this competitive environment, 
for such policies might represent a high cost in terms 
of individ~al opportunities and industry efficiency. 
5. Managing tM.s iv.dustry of conti.nuously changing individual 
producing units ·vill b-e a mcnum~::ntal task administratively. 
6. Although the national surplus problem may make supply 
management an administrative necessity, it represe~ts 
the application of methods which seems to be effective 
in the stable industry structures of oligopoly tv a highly 
competitive ind.ustry structure, This has never been done 
successfully and we will need to proceed carefully. 
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ALTERNATIVE DAIRY PROG.RANS 
By 
K. ~oJ. Kepner 
The present dairy price support program requires the Secretary of 
Agriculture to support milk prices at such level between 75 and 90 per-
cent of parity as he "determines necessary in order to assure an adequate 
supply". This law is seemingly unsatisfactory in at least tt-to aspects. 
First, the level which may be established under the adequate supply cri-
terion may not provide an adequate income for dairy farmers. Secondly, 
there is no way to avoid excessively high governmental expenditures 
because the government is required to support unlimited milk production. 
This second factor endangers the continuation of any dairy support program. 
The unfavorable and unexpected development in consumption last year 
emphasized the shortcomings of the present program. Although the per 
capita consumption of dairy products has been declining slightly during 
recent years, the increase in population has generally been an offsetting 
factor with the result being that total consumption has increased. During 
1961 production increased about 11:2 percent, a rate slightly less than the 
increase in population. However, total consumption declined in 1961 by 
approximately 2~ billion pounds on a milkfat equivalent basis. As are-
sult, government expenditures for surplus dairy products will exceed half 
a billion dollars this marketing year, nearly double last year's e~cpendi~ 
tures. 
To illustrate the cost of the present program, $540 million, let us 
put it on a more familiar base. It represents 42 cents per hundredweight 
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of milk produced in the United States during 1961. Expressed in terms 
of dairy cows it amounts to nearly $30 for each dairy cow in the country 
or to nearly $1,000 for each 33 cow da1ry herd. This is the situation 
that has brought forth the discussion of alte1n1tive dairy programs and 
it is toward a correction of this imbalance between supply and dentand 
that alternative policy suggestions have been made. 
Three alternatives have been receiving the most consideration: 
1. Free market with no price supports or marketing controls. 
2. Price supports at 75 percent of parity (present level is 
about 83 percent) with no marketing controls. 
3. Supply management with price supporLs continued near the 
present level. 
The expected results for the next marketing year under each of these alter-
natives with regard to milk prices, producer income and governmental cost 
have been estimated by the U.S.D.A., Table I. 
Table I 
Expectations Under Alternative Da1ry Programs 
Alternative Nfg. Nilk Price Total Producer Government 
Income Cost 
Free market $2.50 down $1 billion none 
75% parity 3.10 do~·m $350 million $450 million 
Supply management 3.40 same as in 1961 300 million 
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From these expectations the following conclusions can be drawn. A 
free market program, while having no governmental cost, would reduce pro-
ducer income drastically during the next year. Price supports at 75% of 
parity would also result in a substantial reduction in producer income, 
and at the same time, governmental cost would be considerable. This pro-
gram would have little affect on milk production during 1962 because pro-
duction adjustments to price changes generally require several years. A 
supply management program, as that proposed by the Administration, would 
limit governmental expenditures and maintain producer income near the pre-
sent level. Basically, the cost of the support program would be controlled 
by placing a surplus marketing fee on milk marketed in excess of a pro-
ducer's marketing allotment. 
How can an individual dairyman or a marketing organization decide 
which alternative he or they should favor? I would list three general 
factors that should be considered: (1) objectives, (2) expectations, 
and (3) situation. 
Objectives: What do you believe a dairy program should accomplish, 
that is, what should be the objectives of such a program? Some of the 
desirable objectives that are often listed include maintain and improve 
producer income, give producers a satisfactory income in view of their 
labor and investment, limit government expenditures, have a minimum of 
government interference, strengthen consumer demand, maintain the family 
farm, and obtain and maintain a balance between supply and demand. 
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A program could be easily written to obtain any one of these objectives 
by itself, but difficulties are often encountered when a combination of 
objectives or a balance among objectives are thought desirable. Several 
of the above objectives are, at the very minimum, in partial opposition 
to one another. That is, a program which maintains and improves producer 
income might be in conflict with the objective to strengthen consumer 
demand. 
Expectations: By expectations I have reference to the results that 
one expects under each of the possible alternatives. I have previously 
indicated the expectations of the U.S.D.A. with regard to three alter-
natives during the next marketing year. However when making a decision 
on the possible alternatives, one's expectations must extend beyond one 
year. That is, the long-term implications of each alternative must be 
carefully weighed along with the short-tet:m implications. Admittedly 
these can, at the best, only be estimates, but the best possible estimates 
must be made and a decision reached on basis of these estimates. 
Expectations under any supply manaecment program should be greatly 
dependent upon the specific provisions of the plan. The most important 
provisions,as I view them, of the Administration's supply management pro-
posal follow·: 
1. The Secretary has the authority to support prices up to 90% 
of parity. 
2. Producers will have the opportunity to decide in a referendum 
between a higher support price with supply manaeement or a 
low~r support price without supply management. 
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3. Governmental expenditures for the dairy price support program 
will be limited to $300 million. 
4. Each producer will be assigned a base on the basis of his 1961 
production and these bases will be transferable from one pro-
ducer to another. 
5. A producer's marketing allotment will be determined by multiply-
ing the marketing allotment percentage by the producer's base. 
6. The marketing allotment percentage will be determined by divid-
ing the estimated demand for the marketing year by the aggregate 
of all producer bases. 
7. Surplus marketing fees up to $2.75 per hundredweight will be 
levied against marketings in excess of a producer's allotment. 
The National Milk Producers Federation is presently discussing an 
alternative proposal throughout the country. In my opinion, these two 
proposals are basically similar because they both provide the legal frame-
work for supply management and give producers the opportunity to choose 
between such a program with higher support prices and lower support prices 
without supply managernent provisions. However, the Federation's proposal 
would limit the amount of adjustxnent in any one marketing year by restrict-
ing any reduction in support price to 20 cents per hundredweight, by re-
stricting any allotment cuts to 5 percent per year, and by defining sit· 
uations where the $300 million limit on public expenditures would not be 
applicable. 
Situation: I will classify dairy farms into three general classes on 
the basis of (a) extent of planned expansion, (b) amount of debt financing 
and (c) degree of operational efficiency. Some generalizations can then 
be made with respect to these classifications and two of the alternatives, 
free market and supply management. A producer who is planning expansion 
might favor a free market program because under supply management expan-
sion is possible only at a higher cost. On the other hand, a producer 
tl~t has a relatively great amount of debt capital in his operation would 
probably favor a supply management program because of its price assurance 
features. On the basis of efficiency, the relatively efficient op~~rator 
would likely favor a free market because he would be better able to 
11weather11 a period of depressed prices. 
This analysis of various situations based on expansion, financing, 
and efficiency has considered each factor in isolation from the other 
factors. ~vhat happens in an actual situation when all of the above faa-
tors apply to a given producer? As an example, let's examine what the 
reasoning might be of a producer who is planning expansion, has relatively 
large amounts of borrowed capital, and has an efficient operation. From 
the standpoint of expansion and efficiency this producer would likely favor 
a program approaching the free market. However, there is certainly a limit 
on the price decline that such an operation could take and still survive. 
If the priceswere so low that funds were not available to meet interest 
and principal payments, then this producer might well favor another alter-
native that has some price assurance features. This illustrates the impor-
tance of considering the existing situation end one's expectations together 
when deciding which program will be most acceptable to an individual dairy-
man. On the basis of different situation9, neighboring producers might 
favor different alternatives. 
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In closing I would like to emphasize the followinB points: 
1. The dairy industry cannot logically rationalize the present 
si.tuation and problem away because the present productive 
capacity o£ the industryand of agriculture in &eneral io 
exceedingly great. A drop o£ 10 percent in milk prices 
will have little affect on the surplus situation but it 
wi 11 greatly re~luce producer income. 
2. There will be no supply manat,ement program this year but 
it will continue to be discussed as one way to balance 
supply and demand and the possibility of such a program 
exists for future years. 
3. While one may not agree with the alternatives proposed by 
the Administration, I believe the direction of the alter-
natives is correct. Thut is, the industry will have to 
move eilher toward a more competitive pricing system with-
out production reeulations or tho maintenance of present 
prices with some form of production regulAtions. 
4. Promotion should be used tn connection with any prohram 
that is selected but its limitations must be recognized. 
5. Any program must take into account the important changes 
which are taking place in the dairy industry and should 
be administered to minimize interference with desirablP 
long-term trends and economic adjustments in the industry. 
A time of decision appears to be ncar for the dairy industry. The 
industry has the opportunity to express its opinion on alternative pto~ 
grams through its congressional and cooperative representation. After 
the facts have been obtained, it will be your decision, but this decision 
should come only after the facts are known and the implications arc weighed. 
The attitude that my mind is made up so why confuse me with facts cannot 
be tolerated. The thing that distinguishes man from other forms of life 
is his ability to acapt through an intelligent decision making process. 
Lack of adaptation can bring death to individuals, to firms and to entire 
industries. Let us 1lse this ability to adapt end hope the old adda.gc is 
true, that given enough facts one can't help but make the right decision. 
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SOl'-ill: PROS AND CONS OF SUPPLY COl~TROL PROPOSALS 
E. F. Baumer 
It is my J.ssignment to present soMe of the arguments for a.nd 
against the proposals deslins with supply control. The arguments 
presented here by no means exhaust the list oi' pros o.nd cons on this 
type of proposal but they are intended to stimulate discus~ion and 
thinking. First some arguments for supply control legislation. 
1. This t;ype of a. regulation would more nearly approach a 
self-help plan. There would be a limit oi' ~300,000,000.00 or public 
finds to support dairy products and expenditures above this amount 
would be paid for by those producers who expanded production above 
their base. The amount of penalty to be pd.id on production above the 
ba.se would then depend on the level of support and the value of this 
excess production on the open market. In this fashion the surplus 
products pUl~chased to support producer prices would be paid for by 
those fanners who produced above their base. 
2. A minimum or interference would occur with production 
i:i.d.justment if' quotas ..J.J4 e easily negotl..:~.ble. This point is gen-
erally J.rgued from two <..~.ngles. First ... ~ production control pro~ram. 
can prevent production adjustments from occurring if these proarams 
would be so written as to freeze production. Production adjustment 
are alwdys t~~ing pl~ce in an industry a.nd clre a ~nifestation of 
the law of col!lpar..t.tive ad.vantac;e. Second1 it is argued that a 
producer knuwing his expected output can so arrdnge his factors 
of production so as to obtain the lowest cost possible. He need .not 
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be primarily concerned witb obtaining maxinn~ output but rclther with 
the production of a fixed output at lm1est cost. 
3· It will not be necessary to nuke the a.d.justment by lo>7ering 
price. SUpply response to price has been small where measurements of 
this relationship have been made. This would maJ.n that in order to 
aet the needed production cldjust1aents, prices would need to be reduced 
materially and that they sta.y at this lower level long enough to drive 
out a significant volume of productlon. 1l'his would, therefore, lower 
incomes to a signific~nt se~nent of agricultur~ producers and cause 
severe economic hardships in regions where dairying is the primary 
farm enterprise. 
4. Farmers have a strong hand in determining the dctl:l.ils of 
the program. An. industry committee would be set up to develop the 
program dnd to be a.dvisory to the Secreta1~ in ddrninisterincr it. It 
is doubtful however, th.lt Conares::: will Q.ssign as much power a.nd 
influence to this COltl.l'll.1ttee as some are suggesting. Congress will 
need to be consistant on this point and viill, therefore, be :t•eluctant 
to delegate much power to such an industry committee. 
5· The use of quotas will likely result in less entry u.nd 
exit from the dairy business. Benes would need to be obt.J.ined and 
paid for resulting in sorae difficulty o.t least ..,.B compd.red to free 
entry. This fa.ct would also serve us some protection frmn othe1· 
enterprises where supply re&trictions or a.ll sorts might be enforced. 
6. It will no longer be necessary to buy products in order 
to support prices. This objective can ulso be a.tt..1ined by buyill6 up 
bases, thus malcing: it unneccessary for the government to buy and store 
dairy products. 
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7. The fiua.l decision relative to such c:t. supply control measure 
would rest with the producers themselves. 'ro rtl.l.:'(e such <.1 procr.J.M 
operative it 'iWuld be necessary to obtain d.l1 affirmative vote from 
two-thirds of the producers voti113. 
Some arguments <1gainst supply control. 
1. The problem of administration w.1uJ.d be more difficult 
them is generull y anticipated. Althoue;h da.ta. on production ure 
available for rnost fluid markets there ls little availJ.ble for rrtJ.nu-
fd.cturilJS milk produce.cs. Even in o. sta.te ...LS hi.{Shly industrialized 
as Ohio, there .J.re more nunufa.cturing rJilk producers th<l 'n fluld wilk 
producers. Tr.te multitude of tr.J.nsfers c:Lnd cha.nges iu payment ..lrr-.tnge-
ments would nuke such a program difficult to u.dminir;ter. 
2. Such o. progrr.JJ11 iWuld require the full cooperation of pro-
ducers. As has been pointed out above, u.dlilinistr,..ttion would be 
difficult and without the support of p1·odu.cers it; would be even more 
dif.ficult. There is consid.cr..l.ble doubt thaL protlucers wlll support 
supply control lee;isLttion a.t this tl1~1e ;.nd therefore, vTOuld view 
such a proe;ra:m with limited enthuniu.nw. 
3. The rroblem of ma.intu.ininc Ct3Y 1 ty atnouG producers 1wuld 
be difficult. This is enpccia.lly true a.n one lilOVes from fluid 1,m.rkets 
to manufacturing m:J.rltets, deficit ma.rl:ets to surplus ma.rkets d.nd from 
one region to dnother. 
4. It is essenti..ll to IDC;l.intcJ.in l'C:J.sonable prices to consLu11ers. 
The supply-demand ba.la.nce is a rather delicate one o..nd a.lten:i<-Ltionn 
in either supply or demand can h<-Lve substanti.:ll effects on prices -'Go 
consumers. "Hith the num1,er of new substitute dairy products ou the 
market today it is important to maintain a competitive level on 
price to consumers for fear of losing a substantial portion of the 
market to the substitutes. 
5. It is likely that higher producer prices would have 
adverse effect on our foreign markets. It is also argued that these 
foreign markets are essential if prices are to be muintained at pre-
sent levels especially considering the rapid rate of technological 
adoption in the producer segment of' the industry. 
6. It would be doubtful tho.t quotas 'WOuld result in any real 
improvement in producer income since the quotas would be capitalized 
into the business. It vrouJ.d be a cost of doinG business - something 
like "good will" in industx·y. 
7• The long run a.nd short run goals of the proe;ram o.re not 
clear. A:re prices to producers to be ma.intained or increased. in the 
short run? What is to be done with the smo.ll du.l.rymcn'l These u.re only 
two of a long liot or such questions that often come up in opposition 
to quota plans. 
As was stated in the beginning this list of pros and cons does 
not exhuusc all the possibilities. These are presented in ru1 effort 
to stimulate thinlcinc; on some of' the more important issues. 
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MARGINS, PRICES AND CO!v.IPETITION IN THE FR{)'IT AHD VEGE'l'ABLE IliDUSTRY 
Alden c. Manchester 
AGricultural Economist 
M.arketine Economics Division 
U.S.D.A. 
Last year marketins charges took t)5 cents out of each dollar s~ent 
by consumers for fresh fruits and vegetables. This margin covers the 
services performed by firms all the way throuBh the marketing channels, 
including packers and shippers, transportation asencies, wholesalers 
of all kinds, and retailers. Over a period of time, the costs of each 
of these flrms must be covered by the prices it receives or it will soon 
be out of business. 
The objective of this dlscusslon today is to try to understand a 
little better the nature of competition at each level in the marketing 
system and the way that margins are established. Most of the emphasis 
will be at the retail level, since this accounts for the be~eest sin{~le 
share of the overall marketing margin. 
The Nature of Competition 
The form of competition varies in the different llkl.rkets throuc,h 
which fresh fruits and vecetableo pass. It is influenced by the num-
ber and size of firms in each market and the number of products which 
each firm sells. In general, the greater the number~f sellers in a 
market and the smaller the proportion handled by each firm, the smaJ.ler 
the amount of influence which each firm has on prlce. It is apparent 
that a firm which accounts for less than 1 percent of the total sules in 
the market will not affect the price much by any decision which it makes. 
On the other hand, the fir111 with 20 percent of the market will have a 
111.0.rked effect on the price lf it increases Ltn output by 50 -per cent. 
The firm 11hi.ch sells only one p:;:odLlCt must l}ve or die on the 
returns from sell Ln[i chat -product. On the other hd.nd, a firm wlth a 
broad line has mo..ny opportunities to shift the bLlrden of the overhead 
costs amonG products, as lon~ as it avera[.CS out to a profit on the 
total. Also, such a flrm is better-equipped to weather the storm ii' the 
price of one com:r,1odi ty fa..lls to unprof L table levels, on the old insur-
ance prlnciple of sharinc tne losses. 
Let us cons Lder briefly the kinds of mat~kets in which sellers 
of fresh fruits and veeeta.bles opero..te--hm1 mLtch market pov1er do they 
possess and how p1·evoJ.ent are nmltiple-produ.ct fj rms? 
Firms marketinG fresh fruits and veeetables at shippinG point 
typically handle one or a relatively restricted Group of conJTJlOdities. 
In many areas, they are restr-icted by production condltlons to a si.ngle 
product, e.g., potatoes in No.ine or Idaho, or to o. small number, e.c;., 
deciduous .fruits in the CentroJ. Valley of Cal U'ornia. In other areas, 
broader lines are possible, as in South Florida where twenty-oJd veget~ 
ables are Grown jn the Everclades area. Alth0u~h there are marked 
differences between a.reo.s Ln tne concentration or sellers) even .tn areas 
\There the number is relatively small, the lni'luence of o.ny 0ne seller on 
price is greatly circumscribed. ln most cases tbe J nf'luence is nll. 
The pr.Lce floor for perishables is established b; the out-of-pocket costs 
o:f harvestinG and preparing for market. Overhead costs are covered ln the 
lonG run or not at all. 
At the wholesale level) commodit;y l.Lncs arc c,ener·ally broader 
than at shlppint point. E.<cept in the very larcest markets, the lt:~rGer 
:t'irms handle almost. all t;y-pes of .fresh frults and vec,eLables. l'-io.ny 
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wholesalers profess not to have any ma.cc1n polLcy--they "charce what the 
rnurl~et will bPur" or "wl1nt supply and deu::md detcrmlne. 11 Slnce most 
i-7holesalers are almost entirely traders 1-Tith l.L1:.tle or no allocable, out-
of-pocket costs, mwlesD~e marelns for aJ.iy individual commodity a.re seldom 
cost-related. in the sho1t-.cun. Jkc;atjve mnrcins >lith vrholesale sellinG 
prices lower than the cost delivered ln the market on a single commodity 
for a market as a. 1-1hole i'o1· a short period are not unknown. 
The retail le\ el i.s dominated. by the snperma-~.·ket with its thousands 
of items on the shelves. Curl.~ently, su:permo.-r·kets sell about So percent of 
the total volune of all [,:rocery stores. Ab01Jt two-thirds of the super-
markets are operated by chains. 
The impot'tD .. nt aree. of competition in retailing f1uns and veg-
etables Ls the J oca.l market. In onr stu.dy of m.url:ets throughout the 
country ranging fr0m l'JC\v York City 1-;j th a volume ol' 133 thousand car-
lots down to towns in .est 'fircitnia -vlith a fevr hnndred carlots, the 
largest croup in each rnn.rket (chain, reta Ller cooperat L ve, or voluntary 
eroup) had from 5 to !~2 percent of the volume o.r all retailers (lcavlrJ.G 
out the sales to eo.ti.ur_; places ana inst1tut.i.o11s). rhe averace o[' 43 
markets was 19.5 percent. In only 8 lllli.rlc~ts did the largest firm have 
more than 25 percent of tue bt.tsiness. ·rhe share of tne four larcest 
C,J.'Ot.ps in these markets Tru•ced fr·.)m 13 to 7h pe1·ccnt, averae;ing 41 percent. 
It i.s obv1ons that i nd~ v .Ld.ua.l fn·rnn in 1,1ost of these markets have 
some market power, but in lJO cJ.se does J.ny one fj rm have an;y'thi nt:; ~•PPJ.~oach­
inc; monopoly control. E"ver:r cahin m1.1.St be acJ.tely conscious of the aet Lons 
of its compct.ttors, or the prices he chaJ.'[:,es and the q_uality of produce 
<1hich he of £'ers. 
Each retail Li'Ou:p ctrives to c1·eatc .L'o.c .i.tsclf a fJ.vora.ble com-
petitivc posit101JJ cm,J.blrJinL the va.rious mercha.ndislnc polides U11d prac-
tices in some,lha.t different uo.;rs. All utilize fresh frulto and ve~...etables 
as a 'traffic builder;'' smne attempt to bulld a reputs.t1.on for tflc hi.c.h-
est possible quo.llty o.lmost rege.rJ.less of p1·ice; uh ile others lean more 
tovm.rd price appeaJ. and are satisfied w lth son!CITha.t.. lower levels of 
quali"cy. All t>roups emphasize the cearlrJ.L or procurcnaen-c polic J.es to move-
mcnt of la1·ge vol'I...'L'Iles of' produce w l th fast turnover and ernphe.s is on fresh-
ness. Some have moved tm1a.rd 100 percent prep.?.d:a.cine with every J tern 
in the p1·oduce depo.rt1nent prlee-marked o.nd, wherever posojble, \rrapped. 
Others emphasize the e;reater freedom of choi.ce j nhcrent ln bulk d tsplays, 
caterinc to a croup of snappers who prefer to select theil· own indlvlduaJ. 
pears or potatoes. Each endeavors to at.t:ract. and hold a. c,roup of customers 
to whom its particular set or mcrchandis !11,_. pol i.cleo and practices appea.l.. 
P:r·i cine; Pollc leG c.nd !-1-J.r,~ins 
Typically} a cha.tn sets a tsrset ~urctn for each w~Jor depart-
ment ln the EJtore. The l..art,;et. for the prod11ee dep.Jrt.ment varies wJ.dely 
between chatns--f'rom 25 to I~O percent or the sell inc prtce, with IiJost 
firms in the 26-33 percent 1·ance. '/ariat1 ono ln the tarGet mar[.in 
depend partly on the o .'Crall to:re,et fo:r the fj rm o.nd partly on variat i ons 
ln the role which -che produce department playa in creatln.s the 11 store 
jma.ge" a.nd contrlbut. L!l£., to the prof ito of the f 1 r1n. Only o. few chains 
are concerned about bcinc "competitive" (.)11 all ltems in the produce depJ.rt-
ment. M.Jst arc concerlJed ot.tly about the eeneroJ Lm;presslon or "lra~c' 1 
'lvhich thelr pr lees ere ate. 
1-'Iar() no and selllnc; prices of lndl dduoJ. lt;ems in the produce 
department a.re set so that !:;hey id.ll aver~e ant t:;o the dcpo.rtnent.a.l 
-77-
target m..J.rc;Ln, if a] 1 [.,Oes uccor<lint;; to plan. [t LD General experience 
that. the rnarc,ins rea.l1 zed over the course of a ycax· averac,e out 1 or 2 
percentace polnLs less than the fiGure set. as a. tu.r:._.et. MJ.rf)ns a:t.·c 
varied between comrnod.:..ties. The;y are rel,ltlvely lm1 on some bas:lc Ltems 
such as potatoes and hJ.Gh on mna.ller- volur,le l ter.1s such as farm;y .fruits 
and some vecetables. 
Every week each cha.i.n selects certo.Ln produce items to be adver-
tised. lvl::Jst of the ad.verti sc.l1 iter.lS are l.:Lr&e-volume commodjties which, 
the management hopes, will have c;:t.·eater appefcl to more shoppers than 'lvould 
other cornmodit Les whlch are bought by fe\ver people. The principn.l func-
t ton of the advertised spec 1 als is to brln~ customers into the sto;:e or 
to keep the old customers comint.; j n. Prlcea 'J.lld Lna.r.;ins on advertj sed 
specials are freq,uently some1vhat lm1er than for the same items at; times 
vi hen they are not cJ.dvertj sed. :rh i.s Gl ves the j t.em t..,reate.r· draw inc; power 
in terms of customers and the chaLn hopes to 1nal:e up in volU1lle so.ne or 
all of the dollar profits '"'hJch are civen up '1hcn the mo.r~ino are lowered. 
Independent supe:ra3.rkets and those belonJinc; to small chains are 
typically well infor.med of the sell i.nc; prJ.ces of. their maJor cowpetitors, 
the lo.rger chains--often throuGh the efforts o:r the vlboleso.lers 11ho :fur-
nish them wi. th prJ ce lls ts frm.1 the 1na.jor chains. Their p'C'ic LUG 
decisions are made wJth the prlces oi theu· COlnpetitors ln rn1nd. The 
decision as to which prlces to meet 1s dep~:-.mdcnt po.1·tly upon the lr:lEl.~,e 
lvhich the mana[;er ls atte!Jq:>ti nc to malntaln--c. g., that he ls "corn:petit l.ve 11 
on price, on q,uall ty, or both. 
Small retailers can generally be cha't'acte:J:'i.zed as pr lce-td.kcrs or 
follmvers, D.lthou[,h not ln the sense th8.t they atter.wt to 111eet the pric<..-L• 
of the domin:..~.nt chu.ins. They t;ypically deaJ. '-lith a different clo.ss of 
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customers or a dtfferent type of business (for cxO.l!l!?le, the off-hours 
business of those who do most of their sho:pplne; at:. o. su:per:m.arJ::et). 
F .1ctors .AffectinG Ha.rg~ 
Overall farm-to-retaU margins are affected by several factors. 
We have been able to measure the affects or se·1eru.l. of them. The 
most important factor affecting margins is the level of costs. DurinG 
the postwa.r years, r.lllrketing margins for the market basket of fresh 
fruits and vegetables showed d. consistent u:puard trend which was very 
simllar to the trend of mDxketing costs for fresh :fruits and veeetables 
during this period. 1-1arsins for some commoclities increased. faster than 
costs, while for others the increase was less. This appears to indicate 
that there has been sorae shiftiDG of the burden or costs froru c01nmodities 
such as oranges and snap beans and, to a lesser extent cabbage and tomatoes, 
to other commodities such as lettuce and potatoes ~nd, to a s~lcr extent, · 
sweetpotat:.oes and apples. 
The second factor affecting m:J.rgtno is the level of farm priceo. 
As farm prices rise, margins have a. tendency to increase as '\Tell, but 
only by a fraction of' the percenta.t;e increase in farm priceo. J,!o.rgins 
for ora..I'l[;es, apples_, carrots, ca.bbat;e, lettuce u.nd. onj_ons rise only a 
little in response to increases in the farm prices of those conunoditiea. 
Margins for tomatoes and s11eetpotatoes rioe a.bout half !W much as farm 
prices, in terms of percentages. The response of marG.tns for potu.tocs 
and snap beans to chances in farm prices in intermediate between the 
two groups '"uready mentionecl. In all these cases, the rcsponoes o:C' mo.rgins 
to chan6eS in farm prices also apply on the doum1a.rd side: 'o~hen fv~·rn 
prices decline so do :mart;ins. 
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United States u.vera.c;e marketinc; marcino for u Given commodity 
are also affected by changes in averace t:ca.ns:portation costs brow_; 1t 
about by shifts betvleen supply areas i.n the course of a yea.r. Thus, 
1·7hen New York City shifts from Lone Island to Maine as its major source 
of potatoes, transportation charc;es are somevlhat higher. He v7ere able 
to isolate such a relationship b.:r stutistical means for 9 out of the 10 
commodities analyzed by measurinG the relatj onship between overall market-
inc; margins and the average ler10th of shipment or 14 major markets. SWeet-
potatoes, potatoes, and tomatoes shm·l a Etronc;er effect of length of ship-
ment on margins them do the other connnodities. 
Implications 
Whu.t does all this mean to the grower, packer, and shipper';' How 
is his price affected by the kind of competition which exists at the 
retail level and the way that marketing margins are determined': It is 
apparent that the mont important factor influencing marketlng margins 
for fresh fruits J..nd vegetables is the costs of the firms vthlch handle 
them. Since 1947, marc;ino have just about kept pace with the costs of 
the materials and services 1-1hich mJ.rketinc; firn1s buy, includine; trans-
portation rates and wac,e rates. The nuture of colnpetition among retail-
ers, especially chains, has meant that rllD.rgins did not increase at the 
same rate for all co~nodities. For some fruits ~d vec;eta.bles, marcins 
have increased more than for others, mostly because selline; prices of 
retailers are determined partly by their merchandising policiao. T~w 
basic req_uirement of these merchandising policies is that the prices 
of individual cnmmodities be set so as to help to establish an "i:mc.e;e 11 
of the particular chain or store as a 11lov1-price 11 outlet or a 11high-
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price hich-quality" outlet or somev1hcre in bct1veen these t-v10 extremes, 
Since margins at both:.= 1-1holesale and retail levels are generally 
figured in terms of percentages rather thun an absolute dollars-and-
cents amount, there is some tendency for mar~ins to increase when fal•m 
prices rise and to decline when they decline. However, this influence 
is relatively small. For some commodities, it has almost no effect. 
For a few, the margin increased about half as fast as the farm price. 
Thus, at any given time, the price which sroilers, packers, and 
shippers receive is determined mostly by the supply available. If the 
supply is large and the price relatively low, rnarains for most com-
modities will not change much. For a fev1 1 they will decrease somewhat. 
With conditions reversed and the farm price relatively high, marketing 
margins for a few commodities will increase som.eivhat--for most commodities, 
they will change relatively little. 
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PRICING OF TOHATOES IN 214 OHIO RETAIL STORES 
Joseph D. Brown 
The sole aim of this paper is to consider a few preliminary 
findings on the retail pricing behavior of tomatoes in u random sample 
of Ohio retail stores. 
The Study 
The study period ran 12 weeks from March 27 through June 17, 1961. 
The random sample consisted of chain, voluntary, and independent stores 
located in eight city areas - Canton, Massillion, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
Columbus, Dayton, Lim::J., Toledo, and Youngstown, plus stores in the tmms 
and villages a:t·ound Columbus and Lim. 
Along with the inforrrntion on various types of to:matoes - green-
house, tube, and vine ripe - data were collected for head lettuce, leaf 
lettuce and bibb lettuce und for cabbage. The following information 
was collected each 1-1eek: type of products handled, how handled, price 
0 
wholesale source if possible, quality and other subjective vaJ.ues, 
whether product advertised or not, wholesale price from Federul l.W.rket 
Reports and from the e;rower shipper. 
Along with the price and of course the marketing mare;in deter-
ruination, other objectives of the study were to determine price and 
margin variability in retail stores; the type, frequency, and aw~unt of 
product displayed; trends in llld.rgins during the marl-~etine; season; and 
relation of display, quality, package, etc. to prices and mar13ins. 
The remaining portion of this paper is devoted to the findinGs, 
-82-
Result-s 
Between 3'7 ::md L:.6 percent of the tonutoes on displu.y ivCl'e tube 
tomatoes. The h:Lc;her percentaGes were founCJ_ durinG tjhe earl;>· veel;:s or 
the study. On the other hand, c;reenhouse tom.1toes LJ.lmoot completely 
repl~tced vine ripe tonutoes bet;inninG the \7ee1: of Nay 1 and accounted 
for over 60 percent of the displays durinc; the latter p...1.:rt of the study. 
Based upon ..:1. split-ueek. wholesale price uver:J.ge ('J.1lmrsclJ.y <.1nd 
Friday of previous v7eek 11ith Monday, 'fuesd..::1.y > ...,ncl ~·lednesdu.y of otJ..ted 
week) the ret.:1il price for u.s. ://:1 medium greer:J:1ouse tomatoes was 
responsive to 'l·lholes<.ilc prices, particularly durinG the period of he<1vy 
greenhouse tomato production ( Clurt 1). The resulting absolute mo.rc;in 
in cents per :pound is close to being a stro.ir;ht line during a :period 
of falling price. This meant that the percent m:.;.rgin (:percent of retu.il) 
or percent margino (percent of 1-1holesnlc) increased as prices declined. 
Therefore the retnrn to the retailer per dolJ.u.r of tomato sdlcs durinG 
a lower price period wJ.s greater tho.n during a higher price period. 
Since all types of otores were confuined for this chu.rt, the type of 
pricinG :policy is genert:tlizcd. For the pricinc; policy, it v7ould indicate 
either a fairly constant absolute marc:;in, or an increasinG percent ma.rr;in 
of reta.il ~s wholesale prices declined. 1iht:Lt abov:t the econmn:i.c impli-
cations of this situation? Since the s .. ~lcs of greenhouce tom:.1toes is 
responsive to price clw.nges (i.e. all clastic demand, 1vhich means that 
if :prices are lOivered, consu.mers ·will buy more dollars -vmrth of tonutoes 
than at the higher price), the retailer could increase his sales if he 
were to follow a fixed percent margins as compared to fixed c:tbsolute 
J119..rgin during a falling price level. One question at this point, should 
Chart I 
AVERAGE i-T iOLES.<U.E PRICE, HEriLIL PRICE AlW l'lARGIN 
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the retailer lmrer his reto.il })rice based upon a fixed percentage when 
all greenhouse tomatoes are being sold under the existing pricinG policy? 
A word of cuution, the above chart is bo.sed upon an averugc or a 
measure for centro.l tendency, or in other 1vords there are deviations in 
bo'bh directions from this average figure. For e...'Ca.mple when the retail 
absolute margins are separated by the t;ype of store (chain, volunta.ry 
chain, and independent), the resulting three types of stores ·Hhen churtcd 
(Chart II) do not result in a straie;ht line <1S before; but they fluctuate 
up and dmm, '1-Jhile of course, the central tendency is shown to be relatively 
straie;ht. Another cxo.mple of the sJJne point, Chart III shows the a.vera.ee 
retail price by week i'or u.S. ifl mediUlll green..'louse tol.TII:.l.toes oJ..ong with 
the number o£ observations by ten-cent intervals which are averaged to 
give each weeks averJ.,se price. For <limost ull i·7eeks, the price was within 
a range of 30 cents per pound. 
The retail price for vine ripe and tube tomatoes fell very little 
during this 12-iveel>. period. The resu~tine; absolute margin sho11ed a few 
peaks and dips (i.e. retail 1·7J.S not perfectly responsive to wholes..1le 
changes), with the price level be inc; fo.irly constant, graphic analysis 
does not indicate vlhether retailers are follmving an absolute or percent 
:rna.rgin policy 'for these types of tomu.toes. 
Table I shOivS the resulting absolute and percent mare;ins which 
averaged over the 12-lvee;;: period. The 'Hholesale price used each week 
ivas the split wee~\: (last po.rt of previous and first part of stated) based 
upol1 Federal Market Heports. 
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Chart III 
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Table I 
Absolute and Percent Mursins, 12-11eek Average 
by Tomato Type 214 Ohio Reta.il Stores 
March 27 through June 10, 1961,'<· 
Type of 
Margin 7~1 Med. 
Greenhouse 
~f2 #l 
M-L 5&6 Pac. 
Retail Price 47.9 40.1 37·5 
Absolute 
(cents per lbJ14.18 16.06 12.3¢ 
% Margin 
(o:t' retail) 
* Federal ~~ket Reporto 












1. Ma.rk.etine rrw.rt..ins for Greenhouse tomatoes in cents per pound 
remained relatively constant througnout the season while prices 
paid declined as supplies increased. 
2. Retv.il Lreenhouse tomato prices were more responsive to the 
wholesale prlces th-.l.n were those of tube ~;~.nd vine ripe tomatoes. 
3· Retail p1·ices for greenhouse tomatoes varied arnonB the retail 
stores b;:r about 30 cents per pound. 
4. No difference in pricinc, policy of different types vld.S apparent 
for greenhouse tomatoes. 
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Livestock Marlcet News Needed In The Sixties For The Eastern Corn Belt 
Roy H. Rockenbach, Chief, Market Nei-TS Branch, 
Livestoclc Division, USDA, v1ashington, D.C. 
Before we get in to even vha.t our work is, I vre.nt to explain one 
thing and that is --we don't come out here looking for work. I'm sure 
Clarence Girard will agree with me that ve have plenty to do and we're 
certainly not trying to take over any state operation or any private 
operation in :market news work or to replace anyone. We are here to 
help in any way ve can to show what is done in other states and to 
show the kind of programs that have developed and maybe we can profit 
by some of the successes and failures in other areas. To tell you just 
a little bit about what our work is -- we have forty-eight offices over 
the United States representing points from the east coast to the west 
coast, from New Yorlt to California on down into Texas and up into Minne-
sota. Most of our operations, until a few years ago, were simply federal 
operations. Then it became apparent that there rTere :many needs for more 
intensified information and many kinds of information on a state basis 
and so 1-re began developing federal-state programs. 
Now vhat do we do? We report completed prices on completed sales 
of livestoclt, meat and wool. We have all three under our program that 
is directed out of Washington. Certainly 1-1e couldn't keep track of all 
what's going on all over at once. This is one thing ~'l'e do enr,pb.asize in 
that some people thinl-~:. that ve predict prices and that is not our ;}ob 
to tell farmers, producers or others what the livestock might bring 
tomorrow or the next day or even later on this forenoono This is not 
our job. We try to report completed sales as nearly accurate as to a 
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weight and grade basis as is humanly possible. 
We'll go just a little bit into our past record, then tell you 
where we are today and then a little bit about what the title is: 
"Market News in the Sixties 11 which is what I think vTe are interested 
in. 
MOst of you know that there have been periods of evolution when 
markets change from direct marketing many years ago to terminal markets 
and auction markets. And now the shift is back to more direct marketing. 
Before ve had terminal markets in the United States, all the livestock 
vas marketed direct. And, of course, the auction sales have been going 
on since many years before anyone came to America except for the Indians. 
So, auction markets aren't new, direct marketing isn 1t new and certainly 
I don •t believe that any one type o:f marketing today could handle our 
full livestock production. I don•t believe we could get along without 
the ter.minals without a period of adjustment. Certainly we couldn't get 
along without the auctions. Neither could we get along without the 
direct marketing system we have today. Therefore, it is our job to 
report all of them. 
When Market News was started back along 1918-1925, primarily the 
livestock centers were terminal markets. Therefore, our market reporting 
offices were established at the terminals. This carried on through until 
about 1939 when we started the direct reporting service in Iowa. From 
then on we have gradually developed more direct and auction sale reporting. 
However, it wasn't until just a few years ago that we really got into the 
auction reporting program in such a manner as we believe was fully satisfactor,y. 
As we shifted from terminal market reporting to some direct reporting 
and some auction reporting, we found, of course, that this direct 
auction re~orting is n lot more expensive because you report on less 
livestock per man that you need to do the reporting. This is one of 
the problems. This is iThere we are today. \fe are in the process of 
shifting from primarily reporting terminal markets to covering auction 
sales, direct sales, and of course, we also have problems in the meat 
Md wool :rna.rketing. In vrool trading ll'l.8.JJY years ago the Boston wool 
:ma.J.'ket was the pr:i.JDD.ry center of wool trading. Over the past ten to 
tvrenty years the trading in wool has shifted from the Boston area and 
:many wool mills have sprung up all along the east coast and some out 
on the west coast, etc. So not only in livestock, but in meat and wool 
we have problems in shifting our market reporting. 
You m:tght wonder how we do the livestock market reportins. 1-le 
report livestock at the terminals generally only iThen we sco the live-
stock. We have followed this pattern tl:.II'OU{;;.h auction reportine; and 
believe that we should report the uuction ma.rlrets only if we have a 
man there to view the livestocK. You :miGht say, vrell, (and some states 
have) reported livestod:;: auction :marltets use the auction operator infor-
mation. We're nnt naying this is bad. We 1re saying this is perfectly 
satisfa<"'toly for this local area. Certainly, the auction nnrl;:et operator 
can provide valuable information. But to keep the info:rm::ttion uniform 
and to keep it so it can be understandable in other areas, we need same-
thing besides the individual auction :market operator information. Because 
this auction opero.tor or anyone 1vho is in a local situation ma::r use a 
different grade interDrctation, he may use different terminology, or he 
coul.d even possi.bly be biased, who knows? So, for this reason ite report 
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auction markets in our federal-state program only if we can have a 
person there at the auction market while the sale is in process. 
Now, in the direct marketing a few years ago we might mention that 
we reported many livestocl~ sales. The need of seeing these livestock 
sales out in the feedlot or out on the range or even direct hog reporting 
was not realized to the fullest extent that it was necessary to see some 
of these hogs to verify that the information was accurate and complete. 
Because even though it was accurate, if it is not complete as to the 
shrink or as to the weighing conditions, it is not too valuable. So, 
we have developed a program for checking the sales we report in direct 
trade. (wetll mention that a little bit later when I tell you about 
some of our federal-state programs.) But generally speaking, we believe 
it is necessary to see a good share of the livestock we report even in 
the direct sales in order that we can verify that the information we 
put out is accurate. 
And this is how we report today. We have been, of course, requested 
to use auction-operator information. For many years this has happened. 
There was a time when we used some of this, We found out that it was not 
a good process and certainly today if the auction operators want to furnish 
it to the local newspapers and they find it valuable, this is fine. We 
believe that the federal and the federal-state service can provide uniformity 
to make this ini'or.mation more usable in other areas. 
You might wonder why we need federal or federal-state information. 
We have a. little example in this morning's paper. I picked it up and here 
is the livestock report. Part of it is by the State Department of Agricul-
ture in Ohio. Part of it is USDA for Chicago and there is also a report 
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:prepared by Armour & Company. I don't r..ave any doubt that each one of 
these :put in the best information they could, but I have no doubt either 
t.hat none of these are exactly comparable as far as grade or weighing 
conditions. And therefore, it is rather difficult for the :producer to 
look at these and get the complete lmowledge that he should have. This 
is one reason i-l'by we need federal or federal-state information. I have 
here another market card. This happens to be for the J2th of lviarch and 
we'have one from Illinois for the 13th. On one of these the :price spread 
on butcher hogs is 16.25 to 16.50. On the rflt3.J:'ket card the price on butcher 
hoes is 15.00 to 17.25. Well now, if there is a difference be~reen 15 and 
16.25 on the bottom end of these hogs, tl1at is a real difference in the 
mn.rgin of prof'i t if it means any number of hogs. Certa:LnJ..;y the person 
who put out the market card l am sure did his best and :put on this card 
the way his hogs sold. But he was using a different quality of hogs or 
a different weight of hogs or taking some other things into consideration 
that made the two market reports noncom;parable. l believe Director 1-Tood 
brought up a very good point when he mentioned that to be useful there 
must be an exchanee of information betiTeen states. If we get into this 
common market in Europe, there must not only be an exchange of informati?n 
between states, but there must be an exchange of information bet\reen nations. 
This is the real reason why you need someone or some assistance to make 
information com;parable from one state to another. Certainly Ohio could 
develop their own state reporting program that probably would fit Ohio 
if ail the livestock produced was used in Ohio and none came into 01110 
from other areas. But, if you are to ship livestock out of Ohio or bring 
livestock or meat into Ohio or ship meat out of Ohio, well then you need 
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an exchange o~ information with other states on the same basis that the 
other states are using. This is where we believe we can, as Federal 
people, help you. Certainly, as I mentioned, we don't want to try to 
run anyone~s program (we 1re not here to try and run anyone's program). 
We in the Federal Service are interested in three main things as ~ar 
as the Federal-state Reporting Service is conce1~ed. We are interested 
in seeing that the proper techniques o~ collecting i~ormation are used, 
that enough of the livestoclt is seen and that -vre can assure accuracy. 
We are interested that the same grade interpretation of li vestocl~ is 
used between the various states so that when they talk about a choice 
an:imal in California, you know w'hat they're talking about here in Ohio; 
or if you tallc about a No. 1 hog here in Ohio, they knov.r wha·t. you are 
talking about in Virginia or New Jersey or where the hogs may be going. 
And the final point is -- we are interested in using somewhat of 
the same terminology so the reports co.n be interchanged between the 
states. This is about as far as our requirements o.re in Federal-state 
market reporting programs. 
Now where do we think vre may go in the ne~ct five or ten years 't 
This is difficult to say. I mentioned we don't malte predictions on 
market news in our market reporting. We -vrere accused of this a year 
or so ago. It was stated that we set the prices at a number of markets. 
Certainly I think -vre all agree that some people do use Chicago, Omaha 
or St. Louis as a basing point price. This is perfectly natural. This 
will always happen. Holrever, the prices we release f'rom Chicago or from 
St. Louis, from interior Illinois or from other places, they are all based 
upon sales completed when that report was issued. We do one bit of pre-
dicting and that is -- we make estimated receipts for the day's trade. 
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At a few markets, probably in eight or ten markets, we make advance 
estimates for the following day for Tuesday through Friday. This is 
as far as we go in nwJcing any predictions of the estimated receipts 
for the following days. 
Now, I will try tO. predict a 1i ttle what may happen in market news 
programs for some states. At the present time 1re have seven states that 
vre "WOrk with on a coo}_)erati ve basis and have market reporting. 
with California one of the oldest and most complete programs. 




the leased wire service available to transfer the information be~reen 
the offices and, in fact, their reporters in California in most cases 
are com.Parable to ours in every way. They have an excellent program 
and do the same ty:pe of reporting. They report direct sales. They 
report auction sales and there are two small terminal markets in Cali-
fornia. Possibly you could consider three if you consider Stockton and 
then the two markets just outside Los Angeles as two instead of one. 
vle have six other states with programs. Some of the older ones 
are down in the southeast area (Georgia, Florida, Alabama) which have 
a team of state reporters reporting auction markets. Each of these 
states are divided into four or five sections depending upon har the 
livestock moves within the state. These state ~orters each cover 
one auction market a day, furnish the information to press and radio 
stations and then immediately after the sale furnish this information 
to them. So, the auction market report is on the air either the eveninr 
of the sale or early the next morning and is also available to newspapers 
immediately after the sale. In addition, the information is fortvarded 
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to a central office where it is summarized and a state-wide S'U.llmlary 
is prepared. 
A similar operation is carried on in Geor13ia, Florida and about 
a year and a half ago, nearly two years now, your neighboring state 
of Illinois started a full state-Wide program of auction and direct 
reporting. The work is headquartered in Springfield, Illinois, with 
one man working t.ull time as a coordinator mai~ to maintain uniformity 
in grade interpretation, standards and the techniques of gathering the 
information. Each of the five reporters in Illinois have a section of 
the state. Each reports an auction market o. fu:J.y. In the forenoon they 
check buying stations and packing houses where they buy direct. They 
check the records of these and wha~ they are checking for is that they 
not only check the records, but they look at the hogs that have been 
bought at these plo.ces because our Springfield, Illinois, office calls 
these various states each morning to put out the direct Illinois hog 
report. They collect information on about 20,000 hogs every day. Then 
these five reporters in the various sections of Illinois are spread out 
over the state visiting the buying stations, visiting the packing houses 
where these hogs are bought, checking the grades on the hoes that are 
there for the day and checking the previouo day's records to see that 
we're getting accuro.te information. 
Now, we recognize that this isn't co~lete as far as a direct 
reporting system shouJ.d. be on hogs, but it would certainly be far too 
expensive to keep a reporter at every one of these packer buying houses 
or buying stations. This is the best system that has been devised as 
yet for collecting this direct hog sale information and verifying it. 
We find practically no variation in the prices the.1 give us. There 
Will always be differences of opinion in borderline prices on grade 
and this is, of course, what our reporters are concerned mainly wlith 
when they go visit these buying stations. They are looking at these 
hogs critically as these people are that are at the buying stations 
or packing houses. They may not call the hogs the same grade all the 
time. Certainly they learn what one packer or what another buyer is 
calling a No. l hog or is calling a certain grade or steer of whatever 
it is they are looking for. This, we believe, is the direction that 
market news may go from here on. We can't predict it. All we know 
is that it has proven successful in a number of states. 
We could menti<l'l. some states that have started using auction 
opera.tGr information. I could tell you about a state that collected 
direct hog sale information and recognized that they were getting 25 
. 
to 50 cents under wha.t was being paid. But, they released the information 
believd:ng tha.t the farmer was getting more anyhow than he thought he 
shoul.d because if he took it to the buying station, he would get 50 cents 
more tha.n "W:hat the state had reported it. Well this, of course, proved 
to be very bad information. It was actua.l:cy' misleading so they discon-
tinued this and are now working on a. system of checking the prices they 
receive. 
Now, this has all been part of the development. Several states 
that took auction operator information and released it as a state report 
have discontinued such reports. This has not proven to be successful 
either. We have a good program in Kentudley'. We have revised our agree-
ment with Pennsylvania three times within the past two years to increase 
auction reporting in the state of Pennsylvania. This seems to be the 
direction we are goine. 
We also mentioned that this 1ms costly. I can tell you tho.t in 
Illinois vre are spendinG between $20,000 to fJ)25 ,000 in Illinois to 
~vide the federal supervisory office, the clerl: and the travel. The 
state of Illinois is spending annually in the neighborhood of $55,000. 
This could vary $5,000 in either direction. So, this is an eA.""Pensi ve 
operation, but Ohio is marketing about 4,ooo,ooo hogs each year. If 
you would take these 11.,000,000 hogs and figure them at 200 pounds 
apiece, that would be 8oo,ooo,ooo pounds. If you could just raise 
the average price of hogs a cent per hundredweight on this 800,000,000 
pounds of pork, your $50,000 or whatever your state would spend irould 
be minimized. 
We in the Federal Service do not tell any otate or even recommend 
to any state hovr big their program should be or how much they should 
spend. If they are interested in a program, we will be glad to try to 
help them work out such a program in such a manner as has been found 
satisfactory in other states. 
I certainly believe that you have a great deal to "ivorlt for here 
in Ohio. You have alot or hogs and cattle that are sold direct. Your 
Cincinnati market is not as large as it used to be and is not as important. 
Therefore, I believe it is time you take action if you want federal or 
federal-state reporting. 
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Ansvrers to Some Questions 
1. What is the best procedure for us to improve our marketing reporting 
system in Ohio? 
I believe that we could do a better job of informing the public 
if we had some uniformity on how this information was gathered and 
assembled and also distributed. I think one thing we certainly could 
use is some additional uniformity so that the market reports would 
be more comparable. Of course, as l understand it, you don't have 
any auction reporting or any direct cattle reporting in the state. 
The University people are very well informed on what is happening 
and what has happened in the state. They have county agents and 
Extension people who can taD( to various industry groups or farmers 
and get their ideas. They are in a good position to act as an 
advisory group to the State Department of Agriculture. I believe, 
also, that the producer organizations should be represented in any 
planning for a full-scale market news program. 
2. Do you think this has benefits for markets, packers as well as 
farmers and others "'rho produce livestock? 
There are always side benefits while our service is primarily 
for the producer. There will be some auction markets) there Will 
be some buying stations put out of business by an adequate market 
reporting system. We have found in Illinois, for instance, that 
the bottom end of the price spread has narrowed about fifty cents 
in a year and a half. We have found some of the marginal very small 
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buying stations that were taking a big cut and have gone out of 
business. Because, they were buying these hogs below what the 
market was. There will be some this without a doubt. 
3· If you report direct purchases and the prices that result from 
those purchases, at "ivhat point do you establish the price where 
cattle are sold on a grade and yield bases in a packing plant? 
We have not, as yet, reported prices on a grade and yield 
basis o A fevr oi' our reporter s have mentioned in their westcl"!l 
reports sales on a grade and yield basis. There are three reasons 
why 1-re have stayed a-vray from this. First or all, we do not have 
assurance that the identy of the animal is maintained from the 
producer to the carcass. Secondly, we do not have information 
that the grade has been certified on the proper cattle and third, 
we don 1t know the weighing conditions because, as all of you knovr, 
some packers may shrink from their hot ivei(3ht from one and a half 
to two and three quarters per cent. All or this, of course, would 
throw our fi@.lreS off. So, to date, we have tried to stay away 
from report,ing prices that have been sold on a grade and yield basis. 
If this increases, it will make our prices less comparable. We are 
studying this problem of reporting on pencil shrinks. We may make 
a change in our reporting procedures. At the present time, we are 
putting at the head or the reports that the follovring sales are 
based on 4-5% shrink or 4% shrink, mostly 4% shrinlc, or something 
on this order. We are studying the pitfalls and what the problems 
would be to report all prices on a shru.nlc basis. We are just looking 
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at it; we have made no plans to do this. There are people for and 
against as you could well imagine. 
4. One of the biggest criticisms of the federal market news service 
that the average farmer has is concerning yo1.:1r quotation on hog 
prices. In as much as you are quoting l's, 2's a.nd 31s 1 190's to 
240's with a big spread in price, don't you feel that you would be 
much better orr quoting 190 to 220 No. 11s, No. 2 1s and No. 3's 
and 220 1 s and 24o's rather than making a farmer believe that hogs 
are being sold 190 to 240 all on a pig spread? 
I certainly agree with you 100 percent. But, I doubt if 
you can find our quotations today on our terminal markets or even 
on our direct trade ~th more than a fifty cent price range. Except 
when you get into the extreme weights and I think if you get into the 
extreme weights, we 111 all agree tho.t there is more of a. range. This 
was certainly a fault t\ro years ago, but ue have no.rrot-rcd this spread 
during the past two years. We have done much to narrow this price 
range by either separating weights or grades ~r making different 
combinations. This is certainly a valid criticism, but we have 
narrowed this during the last year and a half. 
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Clarence H. Girard, Director, Packers & Stockyards Division 
Agricultural :tvh:rketing Service, U. S. Departwcnt o:C' Agriculture 
It is a pleastrre to be here today and take ~art in your Fotu~ch Anntml 
Marketing Conference. 
Meetings such as this, I am convinced, serve a very usefUl purpose. 
They strike at the deficiency in communications 1fuich is one of our very 
real problems today. 
This is a problem in fact, that I think might vTell head the list 
of 11livestock marketing problems in 1962" -- and, I might add, in ony 
other year. 
And it is problem that we a:re workine; on in 1962 as i-Te continue to 
strive toward more effective administration of the Packers and Stockyardo 
Ac·l:;. Effective adrniniotration will reg_uire a mo.Jor reorientation o.r P8:S 
functions to achieve a more positive approach to livestocl"- market:Lng. Otrr 
first step will require o.n intensive, nation-idde educationnl proe;ram to 
better inform producers, those in the lives t.ock tnarketing industry, meat 
packers and the general public about the provlsiono, the protection, and 
the aims of the PC:S Act. In return, vre sho.ll ask for advice o.nd GUidance 
from the industr,y in a cooperative effort to solve our many mutuo.l prob ... 
lems. The success of this program ·will depend larc;ely on our ability to 
enlist the aid of the most effective informational media available to 
farmers today .... the J<JA.-tension Service and the cotmt:y ar;ent. 
As for other livestock marketing problema -- those I was asked to 
diocuss today as 11needing action in 1962, -- I could give you a list as 
long as my arm -· some trivial, some of far-reaching import.o.nce. But 
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before getting into any such specifics, I irould. like first to take a few 
minutes to d.iscuso the over-all picture as I sec it and tell you in gen-
eral terms just hOir vre arc approaching the adlninistration of the Packers 
and Stockyards Ac·t in 1962. 
The P&S Act basically is designed to preserve free and open -- but 
fair -- competition in the marketing o:f.' livestock, meat, and poultry. To 
this end., the lair prohibits those 'Who are s"Lfujcct to its provisions from 
engagine; in any practices which restrict competition, control or manipulate 
prices, control the flow of livestock, result in monopolies, or which are 
unfair, deceptive, or unjustly discriminatory. 
These generalities are not fixed. and. irorautable concepts to be applied 
in a theoretical vacu'Ulu. They must be realistico.J..J.y related to a con-
sts.ntly chaneine;, d;yno.mic marketing system. Guidelines that once 1rere so 
simple and clear arc no longer so. When the policy goal was to ensure ·that 
many participants be o.cti ve in o. market, the enforcement technique had to 
do chiefly vrith monopoly and with collusion or other recognized r11.alpractices. 
Now that docentralizatlon, vertical integration, and large retailers 
characterize the marltet, the P&S assignment is not so readily set forth. 
The rules of the game that were well suited. to ·the centralized. marketing 
system of yesteryear arc not necessarily and invariably appropriate to 
the kind of systel!l we have today. 
To carry thls a step further, the greate~t hurdle of all is to bring 
our thinldng up to aate. Our concepts of ilhat is right and 'What is 1v:rong, 
the mores o:f.' the 1aarket, often still are tailored to the older situation. 
We have not replo.ccd them wl th newer ideas applico.ble no11. For exa!11J?le, 
actions by an individual fir111 that 1-rere harmless in a setting free of' 
power dominance l!l.S.Y be harmful indeed when baclccd up by possession of' 
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e1•cat bargaining :pm;rer. This is the dile1nma of market behavior and market 
regulation in todn.y 1 s settine;. 
To put it dif'i'erently, the issue vre face is not vllether certain prac-
tices are inherently bad or good or whether sOtilC firms o.re intrinsicn.lly 
saintly or evil. The issue is how to devise rules of conduct in marll;:eting 
that are best suited to the kind of ma1·keting oystem that has recently 
come into being. He 1'/ill profit much if vre remove the issues from moro.lisn1 
and :pose them in terms of the criteria of a good marketing system. 
We believe tho;t the livestock industr-..1 is interested in good market-
ing because it depends for its life blood on a free and efficient system 
that will move huge quant;it.ies of a good product to millions of consumers 
·without interruption or loss of quaJ.i ty. In other vords, modern condit.ions 
demand an efficient lovr :profit, high volurc.e; tmrestrained marketing system 
that gets a perishable product moved quickly fJJld r1t low cost and to the 
satisfaction of the constuncr. But at the sar.1c time vie all want the system 
to operate to allovr livestock producers and firms of moa.est size to main-
tain some equality of economic opportunity i·Tith those of massive financial 
po-vrer. Such is om· r,1ission and. it is an enormous 1.1ndertaking. 
The size of our task ms.y be placed in more tmderGtandO:ble perspective 
by a brief reviei·T of what has talmn place over the :past lw years. 
Changes tho.t have evolved. in cur marketing system since the P&S Act 
"l·ras passed in 1921 o.re numerous. But perhaps the Plont outstanding are 
the development of the mass merchandising system o.nd the loss of the 
formerly clear st1.'"11Ctu.re in r!larketing. 
Forty years ae;o, iJe had a pretty well-defined system of marketinG 
from producer thrm~h central markets, to the :po.cl:er, throuc;h the vrhole-
soler to the retail store. This pattern, ilhich oi' course still docs exist 
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to some extent, lent itself readily to observation and regulation. Today, 
the livestock producer and the retailer are still fairly well defined, 
bt1.t everythinG in bet;"'·reen is mostly scratilblcd. 
Whereas 40 years ago, 90 percent of livestock marketed went t]:l..rough 
terminal markets, no-vr it's somethine; less ·chan 38 percent. 
In 1930, only about 200 auctions ·11ere in operation. Nmv there are 
sone 2,300 under p~,:S reeulation. Direct sales to the packer, from farm 
or feedlot, have increased no less spectacularly·. 
This trend t01ra.rd decentralized marketing ho.s also been stimulated 
by the trend townrd clecentralization in the meat packing industry. And, 
just to complicate the picture a little more, ife also have to consider the 
varied effects of integration -- the horizontal mergers and acquisitions 
of competing enterprisec b;-r firms of similar typcc, as well as the vertical 
integration of firms performing different :('unctions -- such as cattle feed-
inG by meat packers and slaughtering by retailers. 
Along vrith these shifts in marketing opel~o.tions i-re have irltncssed 
the shift in market power to the retail level tho.t has come abo·l.lt, in the 
main, since World ·Har II. This is indeed something ne-vr for the livestock 
industry. It wna the meat packers' domination of marketing that inspired 
the passage of the P£~s Act in 1921. Novr meo.t po.cl;:crs are complainine; that 
retailers are dicto.tine; prices to them. 
Q.'he growth of reto.il supermarket chains -- both corporate chains and 
independent stores that croup together to achieve the same sort of buying 
pmrer -- is certainly a factor "With irhich ive r1n.wt reclwn. These chains, 
it is widely recoenizcd, account for more than 85 percent of all e;rocery 
store sales. To put it another -vray, more than four-fifths of all food 
retailing in this immense co1.mtry is beinc done by fe"Yrer than 90 thousand 
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stores -- most of them affiliated in chains of one sort or another.. It 
·Has recently reported that only 1,086 buyinG offices account for 8'T per-
cent of the national food sales. 
That such concentration of buying po-vrer as these figures reveal has 
far-reaching effects is perfectly obvious. Such factors as decentralization 
and vertical intecra.tion have their effects, too. But no one person or 
ins·titution has yet made a thorough enOl.JSh S:.P}?raiss.J. of all of these 
changes, many of vfhich are relatively recent, to give us any clear idea 
of just wbat thc:,r li1en.n or i·rhere they are leading us. Such work is under 
way, hovrever, both in Government and outside -- in universities and eA.-:pcri-
ment stations. 
Recently there 1ras set up vii thin the Department of .1\.c;ricul ture a 
taslr. force charc;cd vii th studying t.hc entire J?roblem of the chano;i:rl(3 nature 
of the marketing system for agricultural COti'lffiOcUticc ancl its slc;nifica:t1.ce 
to Department pro,2;ro..ms. Economists from both mm~l;:oting research and mar-
keting programs vrerc bro'U{J;ht toc;e"cbcr _, in the hope that such a t~oo.m could 
come up -vri th usefuJ_ recormnenda.tions. 
We who are concerned 1rl th the a.dministro:t.io:1. of the Packer::> c.nd. Stock-
yards Act also need to s·cudy not only the chances that have been and still 
are goine; on, but also the many new problems that have come alone; 1vlth them. 
We must ask ourselves 11hat nen concepts li1u.::rl:; 1re develop to de·te:rnine irha.t 
is acceptable and "'Jho.:t; iG not, l·rhat is f'air and iiho..t ic unfair. Ancl ire 
expect to obtaj.n va.J.uo..ble guicla.nce in 01..1.r nen.rch :L'or nev concerrt.a from 
the Department to..sk force. 
Our concern, of c01..u·se, i:::: to nee -'chc..t everyone alone; the line 
from the producer to the conm,mcr -- is a1)J.c to e;et fair treatment. 
The fact that the Pe~s Act vras broadcmecl in 1958 to bring irlthin its 
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scope aJJ. stoclD.,ro.rd.s, r:.w..rket agencies, a.nd clcalcro vThose busineso touches 
on interstate commerce, means that we must look at the whole picture, a.nd. 
from all angles. 
It is incumbent upon uo to make sure that throue;h re~ulation we are 
not inadvertently favoring or restrictinB any one t;y:pe o:L market outlet; 
over another. The pu.rpose of the amendment, obviously, was to provide 
tho.t trading practice a sho.ll be unifor111 in o.l1 marketing channels, 
whether at public markets or in the country • 
.AJ..1. of us natu.:r-J.lly would a.gree with this philosophy in principle 
tho.t restraints .... or the lack of them -- should a:9ply equally to all 
marketing methods o.ncl all peroons subject to regula.tion. But vlhen ive 
come to apply this principle, "Ire immediately are confronted with the 
differences in customs and practices that ha.ve er~m up over the years 
in the prev:l.ously tm:rezu].a.tecl phases or the industry. 
Accordingly, 1vc are seeking to confer l·lit.h a.ll segments of the 
industry in an effort to develop regulations which are workable and fair--
rccuJ.a.tions that arc :r.'esponsive to present day tna.rketing conditions. v¥e 
believe, however, that the re~ulations should contain explicit gtti.delines, 
simple and rec.dily understood. Nothine hampers business like uncertainty. 
Nothing daunts or discourc.ges it like the neceosity to take chances, to 
run the risk of fallinc under the condemnation of the law before it can 
be sure just vrha:t; the lail is. 
That is why 1re ha.ve been asking the aid of the livestock industry to 
ehlp us vrite reetua.tiono that are sound, explicit, practical and fair 
regulations, in short, vdth which the industry ca.n live and prosper. 
Some people contend that we should not issue regulations, but admin-
ister the Act on a c~1ce a.nd defend, ca.se-by-casc basis. We do not 
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believe that this io ru1 adequate approach for r110.J.1;:; of our problems tu1der 
the P8:S Act. 
The case approach io curnbersome and poorl;r o.da.pted in man,y inoto.nces 
to keeping pace i·rlth tha cot.unercial innovations of a. dynamic econoiay. 
The regular emerc;e11ce of new marketing ou:t.lets, new· methods of distribu-
tion, new selling devices, a.nd ever-increasing com:.oetitive presstU'as, 
finds us unable to keep pace by udng the case-by-case method. solely. 
Moreover, the case method in certain insta.nccs n1..1.y be unfair as it strikes 
only at individuo.l. firms. Prevention io prefera.blc ·t.o prosecution as a 
fairer means of obtaining compliance 1-ri th the Act ... 
The rule-mo.ld.nc; approach also has the advo..nta.:;e of directing attention 
to an entire indust1~ rather than focusing attention solely on pa.rticular 
firms, and it involves on o.na.lysis of all relevo.n:t aspects o:f' a problem 
rather than deaJ.ing 1rith symptoum. In at1.dition, if members of the industry 
voluntarily participate in the ruJ.e-m.a.l\:ing procecc, they are more apt to 
become partners in the dcvelo:vment of som1.d policien. As a result, ire shall 
be in a position to receive guidance so ·t.hat 11ha.t evolveo is a se:rvs.nt, 
ra·ther than a master. 
This is not to say, hoi·rever, that the l!lere ioouo.nce of even the beot 
of regulations vrill autow.a.tically ensure cor:rpliance vrith the Act o.nd that 
no cases vrill arise thereunder. Those enc;aeed in tlw livestock industry 
are responsible, hon<:wt citizens and poooeoo hiGh ::>ta.ndard.s of business 
integrity; hoirevel", unfortunately there ii'ill aliro..:,ro be sotne, as there are 
in all industrieo .• 1rhose standal"do of buciness ethics ar~ not as hieh o.s 
they should b~g 
A revie'tr of :CorumJ. disciplinary ancl otber J!l'Oceedings under the Packers 
o.nd Stockyards Ac"b concltKled. in the pus'!:; t1ro yearo, or :vresentl~r pending, 
-107-
will indicate the breadth of eu:r enforcement undertaking and the no.tuxe 
of some of the pl~oblems vTith which ire are confronted. 
Proceedine5s based u;pon complaints against pacl::.ero have resulted in 
orders requirinG them to cease and desist from such violations as (1) 
failing to pay for livostock; (2) engaging in tu1fair livestock buyina 
practices by usinG false weights; {3) falsely grading meat; (J~) restricting 
competition in livestock buying; {5) combining to control prices in lamb 
buying; (6) usinr, false advertising; (7) using unfair buying practices at 
hog buying stations; (8) unfairly prici~~ meat; (9) delaying payment for 
livestock; (10) U.Ging m1fair weighing practlceo in buying livestock; 
(11) furnishing inferior products to State institutions. Other pending 
complaints against packers involve (1) failure to pay for poultr~; (2) 
upgrading of beef; (3) failu"r"e to pay for livostock; (l+) falsification 
of meat grades; a.nd (5) live a.nd dressed lo.mb bu~']ine; practiceo. 
A revie1-1 of the dockets of cases bro1:tght ae;o.inst stockyard cvmers, 
n~rket agencies, a.nd dealers involving regiotra.tion ano bondinc, rates 
o.nd charges, trade practiceo, and i7eigbts and irelching shows sor.1e 150 
canes, initiated by the PS~ Division, irere prosect~ced to a conclt~ion 
in the past 2 yeo.ra idth orders issued reqturinc; respondents to cease 
and desist from vo,rious violations of the Act, m.tspending rec;istrations, 
granting reparation for d.al.nages, and o.ffording other relief. v7e have s0111e 
50 caseo pendinp, at the present time. 
In addition, a considerable number of canes have been carried for-
vrard and prosecuted in the Federal Courts, i1herein fines ha.ve been levled 
for violations of the Ac·l:i, inJunctions have been issued to prevent further 
violations, and other action taken in a otmstantial nurm)er of cases. 
Some of the ot;he:~.~ problems we shall be csi vil'J.Z attention to duxing 
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1962 include the uGe of 11pencil shrj_nJ:c. 11 Should iTC forbid it at public 
markets if vre a.llo1r it in the cotmtry'? If so: 1rhcre do i·re draw the line? 
Ho-vr do we make a di::rtinction? 
The bonding of packers and the prompt payment for livestock and 
meat also need attention. Should anything be done about these and, if 
so, -vrhat? 
vle are carncstl~r Geeldng your views on these and other matters. He 
feel that those in the incl.ustry must take a stMd on irhat kind o:e industry 
they want to live "ir:Lth and must help form conceiJts of right and vrrone;, 
fair and unfair, by 1rhich all in the industry should be guided. 
These are just oo1,1e of the perplexing problems we are presently 
grappling with. Others, such as false ancl dcceJ?tive iveishing practices, 
price manipulations, conflictG of interest such an \Then market ac;encies 
pm"chase out of consie;nment i'or speculative purpoccc 
neem to have vrith us to a greater or leG:::c:r clegrce. 
Vle also receive cot.1plainto about practices which have the effect of 
avoiding buying competition -- for example, division of buying territories, 
agreements not to compete, the furnishinG o:l' col!lpcti tors vrith infor!llation 
on proposed buying operations, and the use of a. cornnon order buyer to 
avoid buying competition. 
We believe that all such practices violate the Packers and Stoclcyards 
Act. It would be better all around if industry- 1rotu.d voluntaril~r stop 
theGe practices irlthout action on our part. Brrt l·re lmow from c::::pcrience 
that there 1-rill aJ..1rays be some vrho vTill overstep the bormds to obtain an 
unfair economic ndw..nta;~e. In the less serious cases) vre offer o. violator 
an opportunity to enter into u stipulat.ion under 1l'nich he aerees to discon-
tinue the unla-vrJ.'ul 1)ractice. In the more cerious cases) hovrever, formal 
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action is usually necesoary to obtain ef'l'ectivc co.1pliance. In the latter 
cases we, of course, must have the facts to prove the violation, and in 
many instances, the cconowic effects thereof. 'He cannot proceed sun1.11arily. 
lie must obtain le.~;o.lly sufficient evidence, o.d.nissible in court, before -we 
can make formal charges. 
This is as it should be. But it docn, age.in, mean that "iie must com1t 
on industry help. VJe have the necessary legal authority, but only if people 
in the industry are -viilling to come for'ITard w:i:th the facts and are willing 
to testif;r -- can 1re provide trnly effective enforcement. 
Such cooperation, I believe, displayc a true regard for maintaining 
and fostering a free, com:peti ti ve market inc; system for live stock. fmd 
the value of competitive enterprise, in my opinion, cannot be over-emphasized. 
It is no accident that nations with truly col!lpeti·tive economics have 
never in history embro..ced totoJ.itarian creeds; either of the fascistic 
or communistic variety. 
Certainly the livestock ind.untry is :.111 important part of otu .. national 
economy -- and the maintenance of free and 0:9en -- but fair -- com:pe·ti tion 
within it is important to that same degree. 
To do an efi'octive regulatory job in the livestock and meat marl'i.et-
ing industries, I repeat, ve need industr-./ helJl. vle llmst have the facts 
that only those 'Who are knowledgeable in the inclustry can supply.. Only 
then can we mal\:e inforliled judgments as to hov ve can best adrninister a 
la:~or that is designed to preserve competition in this important area. TrJe 
must work together 1iith industry -- it is in ou:r common interest. 
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cm .. I\.IH I'L'jill) AND Ii'.l\HH SUPPLY S1~f3SIOTT 
nons Ni.lncr, Chairmo.n 
The Gove:cnrne!lG h.::JJJ h8,d 33 continuous years in the :l:'.:?J.Yil cor'u :ocEty 
business. Esscnt:Lo.lly :i:c s-tnrted ivith the Fcdcl·al Ffti11l Bonrcl 5.n 1929. 
Dm·ine; th:i.o pcrioo. ;rc ho,ve had a w..a.jor dcpr.c:::sio:1 1 a boor.1, o, rnajor wn,r 
and :peace. Rcc;arc11ess of our state of eco:1.omic and military affairs, 
1-re have continuouoly had Government i'aru COi1::1od:i:ty :proe;ro.r.1s. 
It is true t.ho.t ti1coe :proe;ram.s have chcmc;cd oor.1e-vrhat ana. an c;ood 
citizens ire should c1o all i•re can to ir,l:provo them. 
In the IJeantine 1iO f.eel thl'!,t the to}?:i cs for this afternoon offer 
a great o:p:portuni"cy -to l:JE: of value to you, !1-?Jr!ely, 11HO'tv to Operc:ce 
Under the Farm Prot;ru:r;1 11 • This meo.ns that iTC r::hall be concerned 1rith 
·tho impact of Govel'lu::ent progrru;1s on clccir::ion :makine; in nanaging grrd.n 
and :feed firns. Ue t:'..re f'Ol'tUJ.lD.te to have tvo very competent speakers. 
Your questions and co1w1en.t;s o.re also neea.ecl, hoircver, to nake ·l:;he :pro-
grar.l u complete S\.l_ccesn. \To :propose tho.t vc hear e~ch of these men, 
then we shall have qucstj_ons which you IT\a:y c.cl;: oi' both ncn. 
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Government Feed Grain Programs and the Grain Business 
W. S. Farris, Agricultural Economics Department 
Purdue University 
Summary of remarks presented at Agricultural Marketing Conference at Ohio 
State University, March 15, 1962. 
We have had a long series of government programs affecting the pro-
duction and marketing of feed grains in the United States since the mid-30's. 
The soil conservation and domestic allotment act of 1936 and 1937 and the 
various modifications and renewals which have been super -imposed on the 
original act have had as general objectives, one to increase and stabilize 
the incomes of those farmers who sell feed and second to increase and 
stabilize the incomes of livestock farmers. The principle method used to 
achieve these objectives has been to reduce and stabilize the supplies of 
feed, and consequently the supplies of livestock products. A major pro-
blem all through the history of our feed grain programs has been the ten-
dency to establish prices for feed grains above that which the market would 
establish at the same time the reduction programs were being tried. The 
consequences which we have all observed of setting support prices at 
what might be called inducement levels has brought activities on the part of 
farmers which tended to thwart the programs rather than to support them. 
It has resulted in confusion and frustration for farmers, has brought dis-
appointment to the politicians, and in general has brought anguish to tax-
payers. (And just possibly has brought a few sleepless nights to some grain 
dealers.) 
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Approaching our present situation we have been through several different 
attempts at supply reduction of feed grains. We tried to balance feed grain 
production with utilization by acreage allotments. This method, which was 
voluntary, did not succeed in balancing production with utilization and as 
allotments became smaller so did compliance. 
We next tried price supports without controls on production with all 
feed grain producers being eligible for these supports. The price support 
levels which accompanied this program were such that they served to induce 
production rather than to restrict it, and possibly served to inhibit utilization. 
The advancement of technology during the period when price support without 
controls were in effect helped to write our history of mounting feed grain 
surpluses and the increasing role of the Commodity Credit Corporation in the 
feed grain business. 
Next in line in our efforts to keep feed grain production down was the 
conservation reserve of the soil bank. Some of the 29, 000, 000 acres in the 
conservation reserve program undoubtedly came out of feed grains but most 
of these acres were marginal acres and this program at best did not cut our 
feed grain production significantly. The acreage reserve program was ad-
dressed more specifically to the cutting of acreage planted to feed producing 
crops but here again relatively high price support levels, rapidly advancing 
technology and, some would say abnormally good weather during the late SO 1 s, 
caused the acreage reserve program to fall far short of its anticipated goal. 
The acreage reserve program probably kept corn production somewhat below 
the levels which might have been realized in the absence of the program but 
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still with only about 7 percent of the corn acreage under the program there 
was much slippage and the carryover of corn continued to mount each year. 
This brings us to the emergency feed grain programs of 1961 and 1962, 
the 1962 program being in the main a carbon copy of the 1961 program. The 
programs were designed to increase farm income and to reduce, or prevent 
further accumulation, of feed grain surplus, Participation in the program 
is voluntary and the farmer can qualify under the program if he will reduce 
his corn acreage by 20 percent below his base acreage as worked out by the 
local ASCS committee. The acreage thus diverted from corn must be used 
for soil conserving purposes. A participating corn grower will be eligible 
for a price support loan at a $1. 20 per bushel (National average) on the 
normal production of the acres planted to corn. In addition he will receive 
a government payment to equal to the support price times 50 percent of the 
normal production of the diverted acres. One half of this payment is made 
soon after the farmer signifies that he will comply with the program and the 
other half after compliance is checked. If the farmer so elects he may 
divert up to 40 percent of his corn acreage and for the additional 20 percent 
diverted he will be paid the support rate times 60 percent of the normal 
production on the land diverted from corn. Sign up for the 1962 emergency 
feed grain program is now underway and the present plan is to complete 
this sign up by March 30. The USDA is anticipating a rate of sign up of 
approximately equal to the 1961 program. Last year's program resulted in 
18 percent reduction and corn acreage but due to good weather, advancing 
technology and other slippage factors, the crop turned out to be only 9 percent 
below the previous year, Expected carryover of corn into the 1962 feeding 
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year is expected to be down by about 200, 000, 000 bushels. The degree of 
participation, the weather, and farmer application of technology will deter-
mine to what extent the 1962 emergency feed grain program will reduce 
total corn supplies. In payment for the two emergency feed grain programs 
the Commodity Credit Corporation was permitted to sell corn from govern-
ment stocks at market price without regard to the previous formula of 105 
percent of support price plus carrying charges. Thus CCC has been a most 
active seller in the market this year as all of you well know, and as long 
as there is a spread of 15 cents or more between the support price and the 
market price farmers will continue to tender large amounts to the govern-
ment and consequently the government will continue to be a seller in the 
market. 
The proposed Food and Agricultural Act of 1962 is designed to: 
1. to improve and protect farm income, 2. reduce the cost of farm pro-
grams to the taxpayer, 3. reduce the government's excessive stocks of 
farm commodities, 4. maintain reasonable and stable prices to consumers 
for food, fiber and other farm products, 5. provide abundant supplies of 
farm products for domestic and foreign needs, 6. conserve and improve 
soil, water, grasslands and forests, 7. expand opportunities of all 
American's for recreational use, water, forests and wild life, and 8. im-
prove the living standards of rural communities through rural renewal. 
The feed grain section of the proposed act title IV, sub title A is an inherent 
part of the administrations announced A, B, C, D program. Abundance, 
-Balance, -Conservation-Development. 
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Under this act, corn, oats, grain sorghum, barley and (at the dis-
cretion of the secretary) rye would be treated for the first time as a single 
commodity for the purposes of bringing total supply of feed grains more 
nearly into the line with needs. The program would be effective for the 1963 
and subsequent crop years. Marketing quotas and acreage allotments would 
be established for all feed grains as one commodity if two thirds of the feed 
grain growers voting in a referendum approved such marketing quotas. 
The marketing quotas and acreage allotments would be proclaimed, worked 
out, and voted on in advance of the production period in which they were to 
apply. The secretary would be authorized to make payments to producers 
who divert feed grain land to conservation uses. Additional land could p:re-
sumably be diverted from feed grains equal to 20 percent of the allotment 
and payments would be made for so doing. Marketing quotas and acreage 
allotments would be mandatory if approved in a referendum. 
Under the proposed new program if marketing quotas were approved by 
producers the level of price supports for feed grains would be between 65 
and 90 percent of parity. Price support on all feed grains would be available 
only to a producer who stayed within all acreage allotment in his farm and 
who compiled with the land use requirements. Presumably such price 
supports would be handled similar to those in previous years. 
If marketing quotas are in effect penalities would be paid by feed grain 
growers who produced and excess acreage of feed grains, This marketing 
penalty would be at a rate of 65 percent of the parity price per bushel. 
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(The February 1962 parity for corn was $1. 60 per bushel). Thus the 
penalty at present levels would be $1. 04 per bushel. 
If marketing quotas are voted down by producers then there will be 
no price support and the commodity Credit Corporation would be authorized 
to sell up to 10, 000, 000 tons of feed grains for unrestricted use at market 
prices. 
If the proposed feed grain program is not enacted then the legislation 
in effect in 1960 would presumably be in force. This would mean unrestricted 
production of corn at fixed price support levels. Corn acreage allotments 
could not be used and there would be no limit or qualification on acreage to 
qualify for price support. The price support rate would be at 90 percent 
of the average price received by farmers during the preceeding three years. 
But at no less than 65 percent of parity. 
In projecting the results of the proposed feed grain program the USDA 
expects (1) production totaling between 135 and 140 million tons in 1963, 
and then ranging from 140 to 145 million tons a year in the mid-1960's, (2) 
carryovers dropping sharply from an estimated 72 million tons October 1, 
1963 to 64 million tons in 1964, 56 million tons in 1965 and 48 million tons 
in 1966, 
The feed grain situation now is that, while we will apparently have a 
reduction in carryover stocks this fall, we have the problem of handling a 
six months supply at year end in addition to the new crop owned largely by 
CCC. CCC will probably be a big seller in the market for some time to come. 
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It is certain that if support prices are substantially above market prices, 
then government takeover will be relatively high and as a consequence CCC 
sales will be proportionately large. 
There is every indication that utilization o£ feed grain will increase. 
Business volume will thus continue at high levels. The question remains 
as to who will handle it. 
If the government policies shift most o£ the grain handling responsibility 
to the trade, then the business will gravitate to the efficient handler, location 
considered. A major difference in the grain situation ahead, assuming that 
CCC stocks are reduced, is that storage income from government stocks 
will be less. Storage space built to accommodate this need only is likely to 
go begging. 
However, grain men still face a situation in which they can earn income 
in the ways they are best equipped to do: 
(1) A handle charge on the farmer's grain. 
(2) Payment for conditioning and storing grain for farmers. 
(3) Blending grai:n to advantage as farm, CCC, and market 
outlets permit. 
(4) Getting margins on grain sold through regular and specialized 
outlets. 
Some implications and observations for grain firms. 
1. Government will be a major receiver and seller of corn for 
several years. 
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2. Grain storage revenue will ebb and flow with the managing 
of CCC inventories. 
3. Assuming that surpluses are reduced the construction of 
additional storage space for the occupancy of CCC corn is 
risky business. 
4. Adequate storage space and efficient handling and con-
ditioning equipment must be maintained. 
5. Quality considerations will probably play an increasing role 
in grain merchandising. A dealer who loses on quality will 
probably lose his margin. 
6. Pricing is likely to be dominate by support rates for several 
years. 
What can the individual dealer do? 
Mainly he will need to create his opportunities for merchandising and 
handling if he expects to get business above that which will come to him 
because of his location. 
He has at least three major avenues open to him. 
1. Be an active purchaser of CCC grain when it can be profitably 
handled by blending operations. This will call for aggressive 
purchasing from farmers and alert merchandising through 
"irregular" outlets. 
2. Increase storage occupancy by offering inducement for farmers 
to store grain. Permit selling on any day elected by the farmer. 
Make offsetting futures sales. 
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3. Actively solicit farmers high moisture corn which would 
otherwise be eligible for support. Dry the grain, give ware-
house receipt so farmer can get price support loan. You can 
earn the storage, some handling charge, and possibly, buy 
the corn and make a margin on it. 
Even though government will be a big factor in the grain business, 
business there will be, and payment will be made to those who handle the 
tremendous quantities of grain needed in our economy. Competition will 
be keen, margins will not always be assured. But the grain handler who 
operates adequate, efficient facilities and who does an aggressive job of 
buying and merchandising will continue to have a prosperous business. 
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TllE GOVERNMENT AliD THE FEED INDUSTRY 
Oakley Jvi, Ru.y 
Director of Market Resea.rcil 
Americo.n Feed Manui'acturers Associo.tion 
PJ,blic agricultural pro~.,;rams is a most controversial subject. 
Ther·~ is disaereement in u.lmost every seBment of agriculture o.s to 
how much the Government should atte1upt to do for u.briculture and what 
the short and lone; run results of alternative programs are likely to 
be. The opinions I ~~press here are my own, and do not necessarily 
agree with opinions of' .AF.MA directors or other AFMA staff members. 
The feed industry probably ho.s not been a.s seriously affected 
by agricultural proerarns as the grain industry. The large surplus o:f' 
feed grains is beinc released as production is cut back, so that there 
is no foreseeable prospect of a feed shorta[_,e within the next few years 
for the u.s. as a whole. Shortages hu.ve occurred in some areas \'lhere 
programs have encouraced farmers to withdra\v from production larue per-
centages of total feed .grain a.crea.~;e. In some cu.ses this has meant 
that feed grains have h.J.d to be imported in l::.~.r13er quantities than 
usual from feed surplus areas which has placed the livestock o.nd poul ... 
try industries o.f' certain a:re-.~.s at .l. disadvantac.,e relative to other 
areas. 
One proerSJn which is important to t.:te feed industry is tl1e miDc 
price support proe;ra.m. Milk supports were raised t:J.bout a year u.eo to 
a point where farmers are willin~ to produce more milk than consumers 
will buy at present prices. Milk feed ratios have been quite f'avor.l.ble 
for ef'f'icient da:ir;ylll.en, and production has been inc:t·easilld. This may 
be detrimental to both the dairy industry and tJ1e feed inU.ustry over 
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the long run. It v7ll1 be more difficult to adjust the overexpanded 
dairy production plant to consumer demru1d than would have been the 
case before the recent expansion. In the short runJ ::10wever, the 
favorable milk feed ratios have been helpful to both dairy farmers 
and the feed industry. The alert feed m:1.n has been -vwrkiDG vlitb. his 
dairy customers to develop a feeding proc;ram which 1-Till help each 
customer to max:imize his profits under tl1e conditions that nmv exist. 
The current dairy sltuation illustra.tes an important point 
concernin.::; agribusiness. An aQ;ricultura.l program is likely to present 
opportunities to alert f~rmers cJ.nd aGribusinessmen regardless of whet~1er 
the proc.;ram is basi call;;' in t.1.1e best interest of a.gricul ture and/ or 
consumers over the lone run. The alert entrepreneur will take advantG{;e 
of these opportunities by u.djustin~ his operation as at;;riculturul pro-
grams chan;;e. 
Current u.s.D.A. administrators favor the development of strict 
control proc;rams for nost a~ricultural products. ·rhe proposed Food 
and AGriculture Act of 1962 permits strict controls for three important 
parts of agriculture - feed [;rains, wheat and dairy. A tur){ey control 
program is beinG considered, e.nd a. refeJ:·endum is likely if the Secretary 
of Ac;riculture feels t1:t it 'Hill be approved by producers. 
The development of procram.s for some commodities vlill 1iJ.;:eJ.y 
lead to programs for ot:.1er commodities. If the dairy and tur~~ey 
industry should be cut bu.ch:, for exar,rple, farmers who have been pro-
ducing these products will have excess ti111e, capital and buildings 
which can no lon0er be used for milk and tur!'i.ey production. Some of 
these resources will be used to produce co;,:w1odities v1~1ich are not con-
trolled, such as beef cattle, egr;s and broilers. T~1is will lead to 
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overproduction of t~1e uncontrolled pro<luc tc dllC.l force producc;.:'s or' tuc 
uncontrolled products to a.sk for contl'ul pr'Oul'ams in self dei'ensE:. 
The feed industry is not lil~ely to be cut bJ.c:. n1l 1Ch in total. J.S 
lone; as cont .. cols are limited to o.. few products. A feed r.nnuf'.wturer 
who has depended heavily on dairy feed 1lliLht be hurt tempor.n· i.ly if' 
dJ.iry should be cut bJ.ck substantially. fiOi7ever, nis customers ;,.rould 
tend to adjust in a short tir.1e to increase thclr productlon oJ:' uncon-
trolled livestocl;: and poultry p1·oducts. Therefore, total fl"'·ecl reqvl.cc-
ments for the country as a W-lole would probJ.bly not be restr lctetl very 
much. 
If -we eventually develop controls for 8.l.l ~mporl:icJ.nt livest..ocli. 
and poultry products, this li'Ould restrict most sec\~ors of '-""uribnsincns 
as well o.s producers. The major objective of tl1e Pl'O[.,rJ.ms would be to 
increase fu.rmers 1 prices by restrictin::; supplies. l'ne consumption of 
meat, m..llk and e_cs would thus be less tl1u.n ivould otl1erwlse occur. 
The controls would J.lso likely result in considerable inef'i'iciency of 
production and l!lArketinL since the most efficient oper,;~.to.cs would not 
be able to expand reJ..dily relative to the less efficient. In Blrllild.r 
fashion, the most efficient areas ·vot.W.d not be a.ble to exp::.:t.nd .r·ed.dily 
rela.ti ve to the less efficient. J.reas. 'Phis wou_ld i'urther inc1·c...osc 
the prices that consU111Grs 1vould h(..We to pay to obt.J.ln a c,ivcn qunntity 
of meat, mill~ <.J.nd e(!,L.,S and -would furt;ner restrict consu.rrrption. 
Ttle aver<l8e feed customer will likely purchasC' snuller qua.ntitles 
of feed if controls a.re developed ±'or the a.nim.oJ. product(s) which he 
produces. It ls popular to exclude Sl1Ull producers from co.nt.L'ols .. -md 
to favor tne sndll producer rela.tive t;o the L;.rt:,e. 'Ellere o.re usually 
more small producers t.hc.n lar z;e producers. H .. =tshinc;ton decision w .. -Jxer s, 
whether Republlcu.ns or Democrc:Lts, usu~1lly ,sive sorne conside:c.ltion to 
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the mwlber of votes involved ·when wakinc., decisions. Also, it would be 
difficult to administer a proera.m vrhich attempted. to control thousands 
of snillll producers. 
In the c.1se of the proposed. turl;:ey marketinG orders) for exmnple, 
the smaJ.lest producers are excluded.. If prices should be increased by 
the pro..;,ram, this would encourage more smDJ..l producers to enter tur-
key production. Thus large corunerclal producers miGht produce a smaller 
percentac,e of the total crop. In the case of the burley tobacco pro-
cram, there has been a substc.1ntia.l c~1-.::.n.ge tov1a.rc.l smaller producers 
over the years, In l9~h, 41)b of the burley tobacco allotments Here 
one acre or less in size, and 8 1/2~ were five acres or more. By 1959, 
74~'6 of the cl.llotiJlents were one ac1·e or less, and only 2~~ were five 
acres or more. 
Most of c~..:..,.ribus L11css is lil:ely to be tichtly controlled if con-
trol procrams are developed for me.1t, 1nilk and. ecgs. The proposed 
turkey marketinf, order illustrates t1e de.::.,ree of controls that can 
be expected. r:1e order provides t.w.t t11rl:e:> p:rocessors could be re-
quired to v7ithhold froJn marketinG ..1. percentC:J{;e of turkeys slau::)J.tered. 
The Advisory Coumittee and the Secretary of A~dcul-cu1·e WOLlld decide 
what percentd.;:_;e would be set ctside, how long t:1e processor v1ould :1.old 
the birds, how he would dispose of the birds ..;.nd how much he v1ould 
receive for processinG and other costs of the set aside. Employees 
of the decreta.ry would lld.ve almost unli:m.ited. access to fa.cilicies 
and records of the processor. A second marl~etinc order has been con-
sidered for turkey e._sgs which would a.pply similar controls to hatcheries. 
Ar;ribusiness controls will li:l:ely be 11idcspread if se-rer.J.l a.c:ri-
cultura.l control prO[J'JJns are developed. A quota.tion from the proposed 
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wheat program of the Food and AGriculture Ace of 1962 provides an 
example. This section on "Reports a.nd Records" reads a.s follmlS: 
"This section shaJ~ apply to warehousemen, pr·ocessors, 
common carriers, and. other handlers of w!1eat u.nd food 
products containing \·;heat, all persons en;;aced in the 
business of purchasing, selling, exportinc:, or trans-
porting \vheat or food products containing wheat----
Any such person shall, from time to time on request of 
the Secretary (of Acriculture), report to the Secretary 
such information and keep such records as the Secretary 
finds to be necessary •••• Such information sha.ll be re-
ported and sucl1 records shall be kept in such r.1J.nner as 
the Secretary shall prescribe ••• the Secretary is hereby 
authorized to exarn:i.ne such books, papers, records, ac-
counts, correspondence, contracts, documents, and memo-
randums as he has reason to believe are relevant and are 
1vithin the control of such person ••• 
"Any person Ll.iling to ma.ke any report or lceep any record 
as required ••• sh;:;.ll be deemed guilty of a misdeueanor and 
upon conviction thereof shall be subject to a fine of not 
more than $5,000 for each violation." 
It is almost a certainty that there will be more goverm:1ent 
in agriculture in the future, and that more and more agricultural 
decisions ivill be made in Hashington. These m.ay restrict the total 
output of animal agriculture belov7 '"hat it llould otherwise be. ~I'his 
does not mean, hm·Tever, thc1t the tota.l output will be less in the 
future t:·nJ.n it has been in the past. In f'act, it is liJ;:ely that 
animal aericulture llill exp::.md somew!1a.t in the foreseeable future 
-vrhether we introduce control programs or noi;. 
Our po)ulatiorc is increasing J.t the r::;.te of shout 20·;~ per decade. 
This is an extrer:1ely favorable factor for anyone >·7ho is in any 1'1'-"-Y con-
cerned >vith food production and r.1ar~:eting. The tot8.l output of m.eat, 
milk and ecs.~_;s ilill probably be less under control programs t!1o.n under 
the free mar~cet, but toto.l output in ej_ther case is li~:ely to increc:\se 
from present levels. T:1is 1-lill me9.n th,::.:.t wore feed 1vill be required. 
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Government programs will not eliminate the need for feed for live-
stock and poultry, or the need for someone to produce and market 
that feed. 
Increasine feed requirements will provide many opportunities 
for those presently connected with the feed industry. No one is in 
better position to tru~e advantage of these opportunities than the per-
son or firm who is a.lreudy in the business. Individuals and companies 
who do the best job of keeping informed und adjusting to changing 
industry requirements -- including chG.nging Government pro[~1·was --
are likely to profit accordingly. 
